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Abstract 
This paper studies the impact of NAFTA on informality and real wages in Mexico. Using a dynamic 
industry model with firm heterogeneity, it is predicted that import tariff elimination could reduce the 
incidence of informality by making more profitable to some firms to enter the formal sector, forcing 
the less productive informal firms to exit the industry, and inducing the most productive formal firms 
to engage in trade. The model also predicts market share reallocations towards the most productive 
firms, and an increase in real wages due to the increased labour demand by these firms. Using data on 
Mexican and U.S. import tariffs together with the Mexican National Survey of Urban Labour 
(ENEU), I find that reductions in the Mexican import tariffs are significantly related to reductions in 
the likelihood of informality in the tradable industries. I also find that informality decreases less in 
industries with higher levels of import penetration, while it decreases more in industries that are 
relatively more export oriented. Finally, I confirm that the elimination of the Mexican import tariffs is 
related to an increase in real wages, and that the elimination of the U.S. import tariff has contributed 
to the expansion of the formal-informal wage differentials.  
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1. Introduction 
 
Over the last 25 years many Latin American countries have abandoned their import-
substitution strategies in order to embrace free trade. While it has been found that this 
change in policy helped the region to recover from the 1980s period of stagnation and 
crises by increasing exports, investment, productivity and growth, there has not been 
any sign of beneficial effects from trade liberalization on the allocation of labour 
between the formal and the informal sector, the latter defined as the set of economic 
activities often, but not exclusively, carried out in small firms or by the self-
employed, which elude government requirements such as registration, tax and social 
security obligations, as well as health and safety rules (Roberts, B. R. (1989)). Under 
the absence of unemployment benefits and a well developed social insurance system, 
one could think of working in the informal sector as the best alternative for a worker 
who loses his formal job and is not able to return to the formal sector, either 
temporarily or permanently, because going into unemployment would leave him 
receiving no income at all. In fact, one can think of the informal sector as a 
competitive sector with relatively free worker entry. It is not difficult to find examples 
of free entry to the informal sector: just think for example of a worker that loses his or 
her job and becomes a street vendor or opens an informal food stand in his own 
house. The investment required in both cases is minimal and in general there are no 
“bureaucratic” or similar kinds of barriers to do so1. 
This paper focuses precisely on analyzing whether trade liberalization leads to an 
increase or a decrease in the rate of informality. It adds to the existing literature by 
analyzing the 1990s Mexican experience. The North American Free Trade Agreement 
came into effect on the 1st of January, 1994 and, according to the legal text, its general 
objective was to create a free-trade zone, through the establishment of clear and 
permanent rules for commerce, so as to help increasing trade volume and investment, 
as well as generating new employment opportunities and better living standards2. The 
impact that NAFTA and other trade liberalization processes have had on the Mexican 
                                                 
1 Cases in which there could be “bureaucratic” barriers to entry are those activities that are controlled 
by an informal, clandestine union. An example is perhaps car washing in Mexico City. The only 
investment a person needs to make in order to enter the business is a bucket and a cloth, but it is well 
known that this activity is usually controlled by a person or a group that decides if the new car washer 
will be allowed to work or not, and it normally depends on paying a regular “fee”. However, even 
though this is common practice, the power of these groups is often limited to a small zone or a 
particular neighbourhood, and the new entrant can always choose to move to another one or to join a 
more convenient group. 
2 NAFTA Secretariat, http://www.nafta-sec-alena.org/DefaultSite/index_e.aspx 
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labour market outcomes and living standards has been previously studied by a number 
of researchers. Among others, Revenga, A. (1995) analyzes how Mexico’s 1985-87 
trade liberalization affected average employment and earnings; Hanson, G. H. (1994) 
studies the effect of economic integration with the United States on state-industry 
employment growth in Mexico. In another paper (Hanson, G. H. (2003)) he examines 
the impacts of trade and investment liberalization on the wage structure of Mexico. 
Finally, Nicita, A. (2004) performs an ex-post analysis of the effects of the trade 
liberalization process in Mexico between 1989 and 2000 on labour income and 
welfare. However, none of these previous studies has dealt with the effect of trade 
liberalization on the size of the informal sector. 
Recent estimates by the World Bank (Maloney, W. F. (1999)) suggest that between 30 
and 40% of the Mexican labour force works in the informal sector. From here, the 
importance of this phenomenon is evident: First, it implies that a significant fraction 
of Mexican workers are unprotected, which puts them in a vulnerable bargaining 
position with their employers. Second, it also means that the corresponding proportion 
of labour income in the country does not generate fiscal revenue, and this is directly 
reflected in the quantity and the quality of the public goods and services provided by 
the state. And third, as the results in this paper will show, informality 
disproportionately affects the less favoured groups, such as the low-skilled workers. 
This intensifies the problems of inequality and poverty for the country as a whole. 
Furthermore, the informal sector does not seem to shrink with economic growth. In 
the case of Mexico, while real GDP grew at an average quarterly rate of 3.17% 
between 1990 and 2002, the rate of informality also increased and, as estimated in this 
paper, it passed from about 47% to approximately 49% of total employment. 
Informality is also an important characteristic of the labour markets in other 
developing countries. Goldberg, P. K. and N. Pavcnik (2003) analyze the cases of 
Brazil and Colombia, two countries that joined the General Agreement on Tariffs and 
Trade (GATT) and where the rates of informality are approximately 35% and 50% of 
the labour force, respectively. They conclude that trade liberalization did not have any 
significant effect on the size of the informal sector in these countries. Currie, J. and A. 
Harrison (1997) study the effect of trade reforms on capital and labour in Morocco 
during the 1980s, and they find that state-owned firms increased employment by 
hiring low-paid temporary workers. Even though these previous studies suggest a null 
or positive effect of the elimination of barriers to trade, the study of the 1990s 
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Mexican experience could provide more conclusive evidence, given that it involves a 
free trade agreement with the largest economy in the world, which means the bilateral 
elimination of import tariffs and at the same time a privileged access for the Mexican 
firms to a much wider market. 
The present study uses a dynamic industry model with heterogeneous firms to analyse 
the possible implications of trade liberalization on the rate of informality. By making 
more profitable to some firms to enter the formal sector rather than the informal 
sector, forcing the less productive informal firms to exit the industry, and inducing the 
most productive formal firms to engage in trade, the model predicts that it is possible 
for trade liberalization to reduce the incidence of informality. Both the exit of the least 
productive firms and the additional export sales gained by the more productive firms 
reallocate market shares towards the more productive firms and contribute to an 
aggregate productivity increase. The increased labour demand by the more productive 
firms (due to their larger market shares) will tend to increase more the real wages in 
industries that experience larger tariff cuts. 
These implications seem to be confirmed by the econometric analysis, which mainly 
relates data on both Mexican and U.S. import tariffs to the Mexican National Survey 
of Urban Labour (ENEU) for the period 1989 through 2002. To preview the results, 
reductions in the Mexican import tariffs are found to reduce significantly the 
likelihood of informality in the tradable sectors: a 1-percentage point decline in the 
Mexican import tariff reduces the probability of informality in a given industry by 
0.392 percentage points. Combining the trade data with information from the Mexican 
input-output matrices available to date, an import tariff is also mapped to the non-
tradable sectors. The corresponding estimates indicate that the reduction in this 
weighted tariff, even though positively correlated with, has not have a significant 
impact on the rate of informality, meaning perhaps that the beneficial effect of trade 
liberalization has not spread outside the tradable industries. Also, when the import 
tariffs are interacted with different measures of exposure to trade for the 
manufacturing sectors –which are constructed using data from the Mexican Annual 
Industrial Survey (EIA), it is found that for a given reduction in the Mexican import 
tariff, informality decreases less in industries with higher levels of import penetration; 
while for a given reduction in the U.S. import tariff, the rate of informality decreases 
more in those industries that are relatively more export oriented. Finally, analyzing 
the effect of trade liberalization on the industry employment shares and the 
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composition of informality within industries, it is found that reductions in the U.S. 
import tariffs are related to an increase in the proportion of workers in a given 
industry, that reductions in the Mexican import tariff generate a decrease in the 
fraction of informal self-employed, and that the elimination of the U.S. import tariff 
seems to have a reallocation effect within the informal labour force, from informal 
salaried to either self-employment or unpaid work. 
Regarding the predictions for the wage distribution, this study confirms the 
conclusions by many other previous studies, in the sense that the elimination of the 
Mexican import tariff has contributed to increase wages. Industries with larger tariff 
cuts experienced larger increases in real wages. Finally, the effect of trade 
liberalization on the wage gap between formal and informal workers is also analyzed 
here, and it is found that the elimination of the U.S. import tariffs on Mexican 
products has contributed to the widening of this wage differential in the tradable 
industries.  
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents the theoretical 
framework. Section 3 provides some background on the Mexican trade liberalization 
process. Section 4 gives a description of the main datasets used. Section 5 presents a 
preliminary analysis of the relationship between trade liberalization and the rate of 
informality. Section 6 develops the corresponding econometric analysis. Section 7 
studies the parallel implications for wages. Section 8 concludes. 
 
 
2. How Could Trade Liberalization Affect Informality? 
 
In order to give an answer to this question, three things must be considered: first, it is 
necessary to model the decision process of firms facing the option of producing either 
in the formal or the informal sector. Second, it is also necessary to incorporate a 
framework that is able to explain how trade liberalization affects the performance of 
firms. And third, these two points have to be put together. Under these considerations, 
a dynamic industry model with firm heterogeneity like the one in Melitz, M. J. (2003) 
can be used to describe the way in which trade liberalization could affect the rate of 
informality. The original model shows how the exposure to trade induces only the 
more productive firms to export while simultaneously forcing the least productive 
firms to exit. Both the exit of the least productive firms and the additional export sales 
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gained by the more productive firms reallocate market shares towards the more 
productive firms and contribute to an aggregate productivity increase. Profits are also 
reallocated towards more productive firms. This model does not consider different 
sectors within an industry in which firms could produce, but as shown below, it is 
relatively easy to include this possibility.  
 
 
2.1. The decision of becoming formal. 
 
To begin, as in the original model, assume that the preferences U  of the 
representative consumer are given by a C.E.S. utility function over a continuum of 
goods indexed by ω . As shown by Dixit, A. and J. Stiglitz (1977), in such a case 
consumer behaviour can be modelled by considering the set of varieties consumed as 
an aggregate good UQ ≡  with an aggregate price P. Optimal consumption and 
expenditure decisions for individual varieties can then be defined as: 
 
( ) ( )
( ) ( ) σ
σ
ωω
ωω
−
−
⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡=
⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡=
1
P
pRr
P
pQq
        (1) 
 
where ( )ωp  is the price for variety ω , P  is the aggregate price, R  is the aggregate 
expenditure, and σ  refers to the constant elasticity of substitution between any two 
goods. There is a continuum of firms in the industry, each one producing a different 
variety. The only factor of production is labour, inelastically supplied at level L, an 
index of the economy’s size. The cost function exhibits constant marginal cost with a 
fixed overhead cost. Labour used is thus a linear function of output q:  
 
                   firms  accross different  0
sector  ain    firms  all  common  to  and  0      ,  
>
>+=
ϕ
ϕ fqfl
  (2) 
 
where f  represents the fixed overhead cost, and ϕ  is a productivity parameter. Each 
firm in the domestic market faces a residual demand curve with constant elasticity σ  
and thus chooses the same profit maximizing mark-up equal to ( ) ρσσ 11 =− .  
Under these assumptions, the profits of a particular firm can be expressed as the 
difference between its revenue and the cost of labour: 
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( ) ⎟⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎜⎝
⎛ +−= ϕϕπ
qfwpq        (3) 
 
where w  is the real wage, common to all firms in a particular industry. Substituting 
p  from (1), maximizing (3) with respect to q , and using the resulting expression for 
the profit-maximizing level of output back in this same equation leads to: 
 
( ) wf
w
k −⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛= −ρ
ρϕϕπ 1         (4) 
 
where ( ) ⎟⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎜⎝
⎛ −= − ρ
ρρ ρ 11 10Pk  and PQP σ
1
0 = . Equation (4) is a general expression for 
the maximum level of profits as a function of the productivity parameter, ϕ . In the 
Melitz, M. J. (2003) model, there are two types of firms: exporters and non exporters. 
Non-exporters derive profits only from their sales in the domestic market, and these 
could be represented by a function like the one in (4). Exporters instead get their 
profits both form their sales in the domestic and the foreign markets. Selling in 
foreign markets implies incurring an extra marginal cost τ  of shipping product units 
abroad, as well as a fixed cost Xf  of entering the foreign markets. Therefore, the total 
profits of an exporting firm can be expressed as the sum of the typical profit function 
for a non-exporting firm and another function that represents the profits obtained from 
exports: ( ) ( ) ( ) XX wfwk −= −ρρτϕϕπ 1 . In the present context, apart from these 
differences between traders and non traders, there might be differences in the profit 
functions of firms in the formal sector with respect to firms in the informal sector. 
Consider first the characteristics of the informal firms. Because of their informal 
status, firms in the informal sector cannot take advantage of any of the trade 
promoting programs conducted by governmental institutions such as the Secretariat of 
Finance, the Secretariat of Economy, or the National Bank for Foreign Trade 
(BANCOMEXT)3, and it is more difficult for them to import machinery and 
equipment than for formal firms, since importing would imply exposure to the 
                                                 
3 For a review of the main governmental programs and instruments for promoting Mexico’s exports, 
see MATTAR, J. (1998): "Export Promotion in Mexico," Integration and Trade 4/5. Institute for the 
Integration of Latin America and the Caribbean, Inter-American Development Bank. 
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customs authority and, therefore, to the government. Thus, assume that informal firms 
cannot import nor export. Also, given that firms in the informal sector evade taxes, 
every period they face a positive probability γ  of being caught by the government. If 
this happens, the government may force them to pay a fine equal to a fraction 0>ε  
of its profits. On the other hand, firms in the formal sector pay taxes and worker 
benefits over wages, so they do not need to hide from the authorities. They can also 
get involved in trade and thus have access to more intermediates and are in general 
more productive than firms in the informal sector. In the present framework, for a 
partition of firms between formal and informal sectors to exist in equilibrium, and in 
order to get the bigger and more productive firms being formal, the marginal costs of 
production in the formal sector are modelled as being lower than those in the informal 
sector, but the fixed overhead costs in the former are assumed to be higher, so that the 
combination of both ends being higher than the fixed overhead cost in the informal 
sector. Regarding the marginal costs, the above can be interpreted as saying that the 
fact that formal firms do not need to hide away from the authorities, that they have 
access to better intermediates, and that they are generally more productive, more than 
compensates for having to pay taxes and worker benefits. As for the higher fixed 
overhead costs, it represents the fact that opening a business in the formal sector 
implies complying with a number of regulations that the informal sector avoids (e.g. 
registration, bureaucracy, and corruption). Furthermore, as described above, whenever 
a formal firm gets involved in trade, it has to pay taxes on imported inputs and exports 
(per-unit costs), and there is also a fixed cost of entering a foreign market, that does 
not vary with the volume of exports (i.e. they have to find and inform prospective 
clients about their products, learn about the practices and rules in the new market, 
comply with foreign regulations and standards, and set up new distribution channels). 
As before, for a partition of the formal sector between traders and non-traders to exist 
in equilibrium, trade costs have to be relatively higher than formality costs.  
Thus, to put the above discussion more formally, let 10 << α  represent the taxes and 
worker benefits paid by the formal firms over wages, let β  represent the fraction by 
which productivity is higher in the formal sector relative to the informal sector, and 
let FI ff  and  represent the fixed overhead costs in the informal sector and the formal 
sector, respectively. It is assumed that βα <  and that IF ff > . Also, as in the Melitz, 
M. J. (2003) model, let τ  be the increased marginal cost of serving the foreign market 
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(i.e. tariffs), and let Xf  represent the fixed costs of entering the trading sub-sector. 
Given that access to trade increases the variety and quality of intermediate goods 
available for the formal firms, one could think of β  as being affected by the degree of 
exposure to trade. In particular, 0<τβ . For a partition between traders and non-
traders within the formal sector to exist, it is assumed that the trade costs relative to 
the overhead production cost in the formal sector are above a threshold level, or that 
FX ff >−1στ . The per-unit trade costs are modelled in the standard iceberg 
formulation, whereby 1>τ  units of a good must be shipped in order for 1 unit to 
arrive at destination.  
At the margin, the decision of a firm of whether to become informal or formal will be 
based on the comparison of the profits that it could make in the informal sector and 
the profits that it could make in the non-trading formal sector only. Using equation (4) 
together with the above assumptions leads to the following profit functions for these 
two types of firms: 
 
( )
( )
( ) ( )( ) ( )⎪
⎪
⎩
⎪⎪⎨
⎧
+−⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡
+
+=
−⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡=
=
−
−
formal trading-non if      1
1
1
            informal if                     
1
1
FF
II
wf
w
k
wf
w
k
αα
ϕβϕπ
ϕϕπ
ϕπ
ρ
ρ
ρ
ρ
 (5) 
 
A firm will choose to become formal whenever its expected profits in this sector are 
higher than the expected profits in the informal sector; this is ( ) ( )ϕπϕπ eIeF ≥ . 
Recalling that firms in the informal sector face a positive probability of being caught 
by the government and of paying a fraction of their profits as a fine, this condition 
defines a cut-off productivity level for firms entering into the formal sector, *Fϕ : 
 
( ) ( ) ( )[ ] ρρρ γεαϕ
−
−
⎭⎬
⎫
⎩⎨
⎧ −−+=
1
11
* 11
kB
ffw IF
F      (6) 
 
where ( )γεα
β ρρ −−⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛
+
+= − 1
1
1 1B . Any firm with a productivity parameter above *Fϕ  
will prefer to produce for the formal sector. In equilibrium, *Fϕ  determines the share 
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of firms in the formal and the informal sectors. Similarly, a firm drawing productivity 
ϕ  produces in the industry if at least the expected revenue from operating in the 
informal sector covers the expected fixed overhead costs of production, i.e. 
( ) 0≥ϕπ eI . This defines an overall zero-profit productivity cut-off for the industry, 
*ϕ . Finally, a firm operating in the formal sector will choose to engage in trade 
whenever its productivity parameter is such that the extra profits from trade are 
nonnegative, ( ) 0≥ϕπ X . This also defines a cut-off productivity level for the trading 
sub-sector, *Xϕ . 
 
2.2. The effects of trade liberalization. 
 
In the Melitz, M. J. (2003) model, trade liberalization comes through a reduction in 
the per-unit trade costs. A decrease in τ  would increase the cut-off productivity level 
for the industry *ϕ , and at the same time it would decrease the cut-off productivity 
level for the trading sub-sector, *Xϕ . This forces the least productive firms to exit and 
at the same time it generates entry of new firms into the trading sub-sector. There is 
also a reallocation of market shares and profits from the least productive to the most 
productive firms, which contributes to an aggregate productivity gain. Finally, the 
expanded exposure to trade offers new profit opportunities only to the more 
productive firms who can cover the entry cost Xf , and it also induces more entry of 
new firms to the industry, as prospective firms respond to the higher potential returns 
associated with a good productivity draw. These two effects together increase the 
labour demand and therefore tend to bid up the real wages in the industry. 
To see the implications of this mechanism for the formal/informal decision, note that 
the cut-off productivity level for formality depends on 0P  through k , and 0P  in turn 
depends on the aggregate productivity level in the industry. *Fϕ  is also a function of 
real wages, w , and the productivity differential between the formal and informal 
firms (through B), β . In the present framework, these are the three channels through 
which trade liberalization could affect the decision of a firm of whether to become 
formal or to stay in the informal sector. 
First, if there is no effect on β , then the only channel in which trade liberalization 
affects informality is through wages. As in the Melitz (2003) model, a decrease in τ  
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increases the cut-off productivity *ϕ  and the aggregate productivity level in the 
industry. As shown in appendix A, 0P  would not change, and given that trade 
liberalization increases the labour demand of the new trading firms and the new 
prospective entrants to the industry, then the real wages in the industry will also tend 
to increase. As can be seen in equation (6), *Fϕ  is an increasing function of wages, 
hence: 
 
Proposition 1. If trade liberalization reduces τ , then: 1) real wages in the industry 
will increase; 2) *Fϕ  will increase, inducing less firms to enter the formal sector; 3) 
*ϕ  will increase, forcing the least productive informal firms to exit the industry; 4) 
*
Xϕ  will decrease, inducing more formal firms to enter the trading sub-sector and 
increasing their employment share; and 5) there will be an ambiguous effect in the 
employment share of the informal sector. (proof: see appendix B) 
 
The effect of trade liberalization on wages has been extensively studied by different 
researchers. For example, Hanson, G. H. (2003) examines the impact of trade 
liberalization on the wage structure of Mexico during the 1990s. He finds that the 
policy reforms resulted in an increase of wage dispersion due to an increase in the 
demand of skill, a reduction of the rents in industries that prior to the reform paid their 
workers higher wages, and a larger premium for workers in states sharing a border 
with the United States. Hanson, G. H. and A. Harrison (1999) study the effect of trade 
liberalization on Mexican wages for the pre-NAFTA period. Using data on Mexican 
manufacturing plants from 1984 to 1990 and from the Mexican industrial census for 
1965-1988, they find that the reduction in tariff protection in 1985 disproportionately 
affected low-skilled workers. Cragg, M. and M. Epelbaum (1996) also analyze the 
Mexican case for the 1987-1993 period, and find that the wages of urban workers 
with completed primary education fell relative to the wages of those with higher 
levels of schooling. Finally, Attanasio, O., P. K. Goldberg and N. Pavcnik (2003) 
investigate the effects of the 1980s and 1990s tariff reductions on the wage 
distribution of Colombia. They identify the increasing returns to college education, 
the changes in industry wages that hurt sectors with initially lower wages and a higher 
fraction of unskilled workers, and shifts of the labour force towards the informal 
sector as the main channels through which trade liberalization affected the wage 
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distribution in that country. Thus, although the effect of trade liberalization on wages 
has been widely studied before, section 7 of this paper will present new evidence on 
this subject that confirms the important relationship between trade policy and labour 
income, and it will also contribute to the existing literature by analyzing the effect of 
trade liberalization on the wage gap between the formal and the informal sectors, 
which has not been studied before. 
On the other hand, there might be an effect on the productivity differential, β . This 
could be so because firms in the formal sector may benefit more from trade 
liberalization than firms in the informal sector, given that they can get involved in 
trade and therefore have access to better and more intermediates coming from abroad. 
Thus,  
 
Proposition 2. If trade liberalization increases productivity in the formal sector, then: 
1) points 1, 3, and 4 in proposition 1 will still hold; 2) there will be an ambiguous 
effect on *Fϕ ; and 3) there will be an ambiguous effect in the employment share of the 
informal sector. (proof: see appendix C) 
 
Intuitively, if the productivity differential between formal and informal firms 
increases, then the profits of the formal firms relative to those of the informal firms 
will also be larger than before. Formal firms will tend to get bigger and at the same 
time informal firms will tend to get smaller, which will bid up the real wages and 
could increase the employment share of the formal sector. To date, there is plenty of 
evidence on the fact that trade liberalization helps in increasing productivity. To 
mention some examples: Fernandes, A. M. (2003) explores Colombian trade policy 
from 1977 to 1991. Using a panel of manufacturing plants, she finds a strong positive 
impact of trade liberalization on productivity. Ferreira, P. C. and J. L. Rossi (2003) 
analyze the Brazilian trade liberalization process of 1988 to 1990. Using industry 
level data, they find large and widespread productivity improvements across 
industries after trade barriers were reduced. Pavcnik, N. (2002) investigates the effects 
of liberalized trade on plant productivity in Chile. Using plant-level data on Chilean 
manufacturers, she finds evidence of within plant productivity improvements that can 
be attributed to trade liberalization for the plants in the import-competing sector. 
Harrison, A. (1994) measures the relationship between productivity and trade reform 
using a panel of firms from Ivory Coast. She finds a positive association between 
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more open trade policies and higher productivity growth. The pre-NAFTA Mexican 
case has also been analyzed before. Tibout, J. and M. Westbrook (1995) examine the 
effects of trade liberalization on productivity for the period 1984 through 1990. Using 
plant-level data provided to them by the Mexican Secretariat of Commerce and 
Industrial Development (nowadays the Secretariat of Economy), they find that 
average costs in most industries fell with trade liberalization. For importables, the 
authors find that the cost reductions were due partly to improvements in relative 
productivity, whereas for exportables they seem to be due to favourable changes in 
relative prices (imported intermediate goods becoming cheaper).  
Overall, the model presented in this section opens the possibility for the effect of trade 
liberalization on informality to be negative; that is, more trade liberalization leading 
to a lower rate of informality. In the context of the Mexican experience under 
NAFTA, the previous propositions could translate in the following hypotheses 
regarding the bilateral elimination of the import tariffs: 
 
a. A lower Mexican import tariff allows firms in the formal sector to obtain cheaper 
inputs, machinery and equipment from the United States, which leads to an 
increase in their productivity. This effect would contribute to the reallocation of 
profits and labour from the less efficient informal firms to more efficient formal 
ones, increasing the employment share of the formal sector. 
b. A reduction in the Mexican import tariff cuts down the costs for U.S. firms of 
operating in Mexico, in the sense that it now becomes cheaper to open a plant in 
Mexico and import intermediate inputs and materials from the U.S. These new, 
more productive entrants will increase labour demand in the formal sector and this 
could as well reduce informality. 
c. A lower U.S. import tariff benefits the Mexican producers by allowing them to 
access the U.S. market in a cheaper and easier way. This would generate new profit 
opportunities, particularly for the more productive firms in the formal sector that 
are able to export, leading to an increase in their labour demand and raising real 
wages. 
 
At the end, after liberalization, one could then observe lower informality rates and 
higher wages in more productive industries, and perhaps higher informality rates in 
less productive ones. 
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3. Trade Policy Background 
 
The beginning of the Mexican trade liberalization process can be traced back to 1986, 
when the country became a member of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
(GATT) and stopped its import-substitution industrialization strategy. According to 
Kate, A. t., C. Macario and G. Niels (2000), and Revenga, A. (1995), the main 
consequences of these changes in trade policy were: (a) a reduction in the coverage of 
import license requirements from 100% of the domestic production in 1982 to 25.4% 
by December 1987, and to 16.5% in 1993; (b) a reduction in the maximum import 
tariff from 100% in 1985 to 20% in 1988; (c) a reduction of the average import tariff 
in the manufacturing sector from 23.5% in 1985 to 11% in 1988; and (d) a reduction 
in the coverage of reference prices in the manufacturing sector from 18.7% in 1985 to 
0% in 1988. 
In 1993 the country expanded its trade liberalization process by signing the North 
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) with the United States and Canada, which 
took effect on the 1st of January 1994, and that aims at the total elimination of import 
tariffs by 2008. The agreement sets up a trade liberalization calendar that classifies 
products and by-products in 5 different groups, according to the date and way in 
which the corresponding import tariffs were going to be eliminated4: 
 
- Group A: products and/or by-products for which tariffs were completely 
eliminated on the 1st of January 1994. 
- Group B: products and/or by-products for which tariffs were gradually eliminated 
in 5 equal annual stages, starting on the 1st of January, 1994, and finishing by the 
1st of January, 1998. 
- Group C: products and/or by-products for which tariffs were gradually eliminated 
in 10 equal annual stages, starting on the 1st of January, 1994, and finishing by the 
1st of January, 2003. 
- Group C+: products and/or by-products for which tariffs were gradually 
eliminated in 15 equal annual stages, starting on the 1st of January, 1994, and 
finishing by the 1st of January, 2008. 
                                                 
4 The text of the North American Free Trade Agreement and the calendar for Mexico’s tariff 
elimination process can be found at the Mexican Secretariat of Economy’s website: 
http://www.economia-snci.gob.mx/sic_php/ls23al.php?s=502&p=1&l=1 
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- Group D: products and/or by-products for which there were no tariffs before and 
after NAFTA. 
 
Apart from tariff elimination, NAFTA also contemplates the partial elimination of 
many barriers to trade in services and to cross-border investment.  
After 1994, Mexico signed other trade agreements with several countries, such as 
Colombia and Venezuela (1995); Costa Rica (1995); Bolivia (1995); Nicaragua 
(1998); Chile (1999); the European Union (2000); Israel (2000); El Salvador, 
Guatemala and Honduras (2001); Iceland, Norway, Liechtenstein and Switzerland 
(2001); Uruguay (2004); and Japan (2005). Nevertheless, NAFTA remains the most 
important event for the Mexican trade policy in the last 20 years, as the United States 
is by far the largest trading partner of the country5. 
 
 
4. Trade and Labour Data 
 
The present study focuses on trade liberalization under NAFTA, and specifically on 
the import tariff elimination part of the agreement. It uses data on both Mexican and 
U.S. tariffs. The Mexican data covers the 1988-2002 period and was collected directly 
from the Law of General Import and Export Tariffs (TIGIE), published by the 
Mexican government in the Official Journal of the Federation (Diario Oficial de la 
Federación). During this period the TIGIE was totally modified in February 1988, 
December 1995 and January 2002. It was also subject to several partial modifications 
between these years: 84 between 1988 and 1995, and 46 between 1995 and 2002. 
Among these changes are those regarding NAFTA and its liberalization calendar, 
starting on January 1994. The data includes ad-valorem tariffs only. Regarding the 
U.S. tariffs, the data comes from the NBER U.S. Tariff Database, constructed by 
Robert C. Feenstra, John Romalis and Peter K. Schott6, and which is based on the 
Harmonized Tariff Schedule of the United States (HTS). It includes ad-valorem,  
 
                                                 
5 According to data published by the Mexican National Institute of Statistics, Geography and 
Computing (INEGI), FOB imports from the U.S. represented on average 69% of total Mexican FOB 
imports between 1990 and 2005. See http://dgcnesyp.inegi.gob.mx/cgi-win/bdieintsi.exe/Consultar. 
6 See: FEENSTRA, R. C., J. ROMALIS, and P. K. SCHOTT (2002): "U.S. Imports, Exports and Tariff Data, 
1989-2001," NBER Working Paper Series. The database is freely available at 
http://gsbwww.uchicago.edu/fac/john.romalis/research/  
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Table 1: Production-Weighted Average Import Tariffs 1989-2002
Mexican Tariff on U.S. 
Imports (% ad valorem)1
U.S. Tariff on Mexican 
Imports (% ad valorem)2
Mean S.D. Mean S.D.
1989 14.03 0.24 2.87 0.27
1990 13.81 0.27 2.92 0.26
1991 13.96 0.26 2.47 0.26
1992 13.88 0.25 2.53 0.27
1993 13.99 0.26 2.41 0.26
1994 7.43 0.30 1.07 0.15
1995 6.40 0.25 1.63 0.19
1996 5.30 0.22 1.01 0.12
1997 4.24 0.20 0.77 0.09
1998 3.13 0.18 0.58 0.07
1999 2.42 0.14 0.41 0.06
2000 1.93 0.12 0.40 0.06
2001 1.42 0.10 0.40 0.07
2002 0.95 0.09 0.11 0.03
Calculations by the author. Weights equal to the share of Mexican sector production
on national GDP. 1 Source: Diario Oficial de la Federacion (Mexico). 2 Source: NBER
U.S. Tariff Database.
 
 
specific and estimated ad-valorem equivalent (AVE) tariffs based on the MFN rate of 
the HTS. The file also indicates products that are eligible for tariff preferences under 
free trade agreements such as with Canada and Mexico, and indicates products 
eligible for any preferential programs such as the Generalized System of Preferences 
(GSP). This database covers the period 1989-2001, and was complemented with the 
year 2002 for the present study, using the original documents of the U.S. tariff 
schedule published by the United States International Trade Commission7. Both the 
Mexican and the U.S. tariff schedules are based on the International Harmonized 
System, the global system of nomenclature that is used to describe most world trade 
in goods. The annual production-weighted average tariffs and their standard 
deviations are reported in table 1. The trade data is linked to individual level data 
from the Mexican National Survey of Urban Employment (ENEU), carried out by the 
National Institute of Statistics, Geography and Computing (INEGI) since 1983. It 
provides information about the state of the Mexican labour market, the main socio-
demographic characteristics of the household members aged 12 and above, and 
housing in the principal urban areas of the country. Among other things, the ENEU 
provides information about employment status, duration of unemployment, job 
                                                 
7 These documents can be found in PDF format at http://www.usitc.gov/tata/hts/archive/index.htm. 
 17
characteristics (position, size of workplace, social security coverage, industry 
affiliation, etc), hours worked, quality of job, and job search. The social security 
coverage data is used to generate an indicator for the informal workers. A person is 
classified as working in the informal sector if he or she runs a firm of 6 or less 
employees and does not have any kind of social or health insurance (informal self-
employed), if he or she works for a firm of any size and does not have any kind of 
social or health insurance (informal salaried), and if he or she works without 
receiving any kind of payment (unpaid workers). This definition is similar to the one 
suggested by Maloney, W. F. (1999). The main socio-demographic characteristics 
covered by the survey are age, gender, kinship, marital status, schooling, place of 
birth, number of children, and migratory status. Regarding housing, the ENEU obtains 
information about type of dwelling, ownership, size, services, and construction 
materials. 
The survey is carried out on a quarterly basis. The sample is divided in five 
independent panels (waves), and each one of them stays in the sample for five 
consecutive quarters. From 1983 to 1984 it covered only the three main cities in 
Mexico (Mexico City, Guadalajara and Monterrey). From 1985 to 1991 its coverage 
was expanded to 16 cities, including also the main cities at the US-Mexico border 
(Ciudad Juarez, Matamoros, Nuevo Laredo and Tijuana). In 1992 other 18 cities were 
included in the survey, and in the subsequent years another 14 cities were added. By 
the fourth quarter of 2000 there were 48 cities covered by the ENEU (and 
approximately 51.2% of the total population of the country was living in these cities 
by that time). This study uses mainly the April-June interviews for each year between 
1989 and 2002. Only employed people are included in the sample. Matching the 
ENEU industry codes with the tariff codes yields an average of 243 tradable 
industries and 96 non-tradable industries per year. Table 2 reports some of the main 
characteristics of the sample for each one of the years covered here, and table 3 
summarizes worker characteristics in the formal and the informal sectors for the 1994 
April-June interview. From the latter it can be seen that hourly wages, years of 
schooling and the fraction of married workers tend to be higher in the formal sector.  
The likelihood of being informal also appears to be lower for the heads of the 
household. Regarding the geographic characteristics, the table suggests that 
informality rates are higher in places closer to Mexico City than to the Mexico-U.S.  
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Table 2: Labour Data. Sample Characteristics by Year
Year Observations Tradable Industries
Non-tradable 
Industries Cities Covered
Informality/Total 
Employment1
1989 60,334 238 96 16 47%
1990 62,441 237 94 16 46%
1991 63,082 237 92 16 46%
1992 114,637 243 94 32 47%
1993 123,460 245 96 35 49%
1994 126,976 244 95 37 50%
1995 130,054 246 95 39 52%
1996 138,384 242 99 41 53%
1997 147,271 247 101 43 52%
1998 153,622 245 95 44 50%
1999 173,095 250 96 45 50%
2000 183,999 248 95 45 49%
2001 190,405 246 99 48 49%
2002 184,229 238 93 48 50%
Maximum 190,405 250 101 48 53%
Minimum 60,334 237 92 16 45%
Average 127,520 243 96 35 49%
Source: Mexican National Survey of Urban Employment (ENEU), INEGI. Calculations based on samples restricted to employed
people. 1 Estimated as the fraction of employed people that are (a) patrons in a firm with less than 6 employees and that do not have
social or health insurance, (b) employees in a firm of any size and that do not have social or health insurance, and (c) employees that
do not receive payment.  
 
border8, and lower in places with high exposure to globalization, as measured by 
Hanson, G. H. (2004)9. At first glance this might appear to be redundant, as one may 
think that cities closer to the Mexico-U.S. border are those located in states with high 
exposure to globalization. However, figure 1 shows that the mapping between these 
two characteristics is not perfect. Finally, regarding the job characteristics, the table 
indicates that the rate of self-employment is much higher in the informal sector than 
in the formal one. The fraction of people working in establishments of less than 6 
persons is also higher, as well as the fraction of people working at home. By the 
definition of informality used here, no one in the informal sector receives any kind of 
social or health insurance. 
                                                 
8 The fraction of people living closer to Mexico City than to the U.S.-Mexico border is estimated with a 
variable that takes the value 0 if the road distance (in kilometres) from a particular city to the closest 
major U.S.-Mexico border crossing is shorter than the road distance between that city and Mexico City. 
It takes the value 1 otherwise. The distance data comes from the Secretariat of Transport and 
Communications. The four major border crossings are Tijuana-San Diego, Nogales, Ciudad Juarez-El 
Paso, and Nuevo Laredo-Laredo. 
9 He measures regional exposure to globalization through the share of maquiladora value added, 
foreign direct investment, and imports in state GDP, each one averaged over the period 1993-1999. 
Hanson sorts states according to their average rank across the three measures and selects as high-
exposure states those whose average rank is in the top third, while low-exposure states are those whose 
average rank is in the bottom third. The high-exposure states are Baja California, Chihuahua, Nuevo 
Leon, Sonora, Jalisco, Tamaulipas and Aguascalientes. The low-exposure states are Zacatecas, 
Quintana Roo, Nayarit, Colima, Guerrero, Veracruz, Chiapas, Campeche, Hidalgo and Oaxaca. 
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Table 3: Formal and Informal Workers 1994
Formal Informal
Personal Characteristics
Hourly wages 8.718 6.172
Male 0.639 0.650
Age 33.229 34.888
Experience 17.366 21.329
Schooling 9.865 7.563
Married 0.556 0.498
Cohabitating 0.044 0.064
Head of household 0.487 0.453
No. of children 1.325 2.427
Geographic Characteristics
Living closer to Mexico City 0.647 0.727
High exposure to globalization 0.296 0.245
Low exporsure to globalization 0.239 0.293
Job Characteristics
Self-employed 0.030 0.430
Work in less than 6 person establishment 0.115 0.801
Work at home 0.235 0.314
Receive annual bonus 0.867 0.053
Paid vacations 0.811 0.035
Receive credit for housing 0.269 0.006
Health insurance 0.961 0.000
Weekly hours worked 42.261 39.033
Has a second job 0.038 0.026
Source: author's calculations based on the Mexican National Survey of Urban Labour
(ENEU) INEGI.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
States with high exposure to globalization1  
  States with low exposure to globalization1  
  Cities closer to the U.S. - Mexico border than to Mexico City 2  
  Mexico City   
1  Exposure to globalization as measured by Hanson, G.H. (2004 )
 2  Proximity is measured by road distance (kilometers)
 
Figure 1. Exposure to Globalization and Proximity to the   
U.S. - Mexico Border  
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5. Trade Liberalization and Informality: Preliminary Analysis 
 
The analysis of the relationship between trade liberalization and informality in this 
paper begins by looking at the behaviour of the average import tariffs and informality 
rate across time. As shown in table 2, the city coverage of the ENEU survey doubled 
in 1992. The 16 original cities passed from representing 100% of the observations 
before 1992 to approximately 40% afterwards10. This is a drastic modification that 
could affect the estimation of the yearly average rate of informality. In order to 
control for this possible bias, the rate of informality is obtained from a regression of 
the indicator for informality defined above on a set of city and time dummies, using 
all the years available in the sample. The estimated year coefficients are then the 
estimates of the annual average informality rate after controlling for the cities 
included in the survey. These coefficients are finally rescaled so that their mean is 
equal to the mean of the informality rate obtained when using the raw data. The 
informality rate and import tariffs series are plotted in Figure 2. The average Mexican 
import tariff on U.S. products remained basically constant at around 14% ad valorem 
between 1989 and 1993. It then dropped to 7% in the first year of NAFTA (1994), and 
continued to decrease gradually to approximately 1% in 2002. The U.S. import tariff 
 
Figure 2: Average Import Tariffs and Informality
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10 The 16 original cities are Mexico City, Guadalajara, Monterrey, Puebla, León, San Luis Potosí, 
Tampico, Torreón, Chihuahua, Orizaba, Veracruz, Mérida, Ciudad Juárez, Tijuana, Nuevo Laredo, and 
Matamoros. These cities represent approximately 35% of the total population of the country. 
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on Mexican products also remained relatively constant between 1989 and 1993, at 
around 3%. This low level of pre-NAFTA tariffs reflects the fact that, according to the 
United States International Trade Commission, Mexico was already being benefited 
with the Generalized System of Preferences by qualifying as a Beneficiary 
Developing Country11. This average tariff then decreased to 1% during the first year 
of NAFTA, increased temporarily to 2% in 1995 as a response to the Mexican peso 
crisis, and continued to decrease gradually to approximately 0.1% 
in 2002. Regarding the share of informality, the figure shows a positive trend starting 
in 1992 and reaching its peak just after the crisis in 1996, making the average rate to 
increase from 48% to 53% of total employment. It then decreased gradually to 49% in 
2002. From figure 2 is difficult to see a clear relationship between trade liberalization 
and informality. On one hand, comparing the level of the latter in the first and the last 
years of the period suggests that this rate moved to a higher permanent level, and this 
would imply a negative relationship between tariff reduction and the rate of 
informality12. But according to the 1992-1996 positive trend, the transition to this new 
permanent level of informality began 3 years before the implementation of NAFTA, 
indicating that the change may be due to factors other than the reduction in the import 
tariffs. On the other hand, there is a negative trend in informality between 1996 and 
2001, which coincides with the gradual reduction in both the Mexican and U.S. 
import tariffs, and this would suggest a positive relationship between the level of the 
tariffs and the rate of informality. But it is very likely that most of this negative trend 
is simply reflecting the recovery of the Mexican economy from the 1995 financial 
crisis. 
To analyze these series at a more disaggregated level, figure 3 decomposes figure 2 
by economic sectors. Once again, an unambiguous relationship between the average 
tariffs and the rate of informality does not seem to be present. Perhaps the strongest 
evidence of a positive relationship comes from the Primary metals and the Farms, 
forestry & fishing sectors. The change to a new steady state level of informality is 
clearer for the Mining and the Food, beverages & tobacco sectors. As in figure 2, the  
 
                                                 
11 For more detail, see the general notes on the Official Harmonized Tariff Schedule of the United 
States Annotated, from the HTSA Basic Publication in any year between 1989 and 1994. These 
documents can be found in the website mentioned in footnote 7. 
12 The correlation coefficients for the series depicted in figure 2 are -0.546 between the Mexican import 
tariff and the rate of informality, and -0.484 between the latter and the U.S. import tariff. 
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Figure 3: Average Import Tariffs and Informality Rates by Sector 
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Figure 3 (continued) 
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transition appears to begin before the implementation of NAFTA and to peak during 
the financial crisis. For the rest of the sectors, the behaviour of the rate of informality 
is either erratic or does not seem to be affected by the import tariff elimination 
process. The last panel in figure 3 summarizes the trends of informality in the non 
tradable sectors. The rate of informality increases with the Mexican crisis in 1995 and 
it does not decrease to its pre-1995 levels afterwards, indicating perhaps that any 
beneficial effect steaming from trade liberalization has not permeated significantly to 
these sectors. 
Table 4 summarizes the changes of the import tariffs and the informality rate for the 
tradable sectors over the 1989-2002 period. It shows the percentage point changes 
from the 1989-91 to the 2000-02 averages. Six of the sectors experienced a reduction 
in their informality rates. The largest increase in the informality rate is of 5.6 
percentage points in the Mining and Food, beverages & tobacco sectors, while the 
largest decrease is of 5.2 percentage points in the Farms, forestry & fishing sector. It 
can also be seen that the Textiles, apparel & leather and the Mining sector are the 
ones with the largest and smallest tariff cuts respectively, both under the Mexican and  
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1989-91 to 2000-02a
Sector Informality Mex US
Farms, forestry & fishing -5.2 -12.6 -1.3
Mining 5.6 -8.1 -0.2
Food, beverage & tobacco 5.6 -12.6 -3.3
Textiles, apparel & leather 0.1 -15.5 -9.2
Wood products -0.7 -9.3 -3.4
Paper & printing 2.0 -10.6 -0.7
Chemical products -1.4 -11.4 -1.5
Nonmetallic mineral products 1.8 -12.7 -1.5
Primary metals -3.3 -11.5 -1.4
Machinery & equipment -1.6 -12.0 -0.8
Other manufacturing -1.6 -13.7 -0.6
Maximum 5.6 -8.1 -0.2
Minimum -5.2 -15.5 -9.2
Average 0.1 -11.8 -2.2
Table 4:  Change in Import Tariffs and Informality by Sector 
(Percentage Points)
Source: author's calculations based on the Mexican National Survey of Urban Labour
(ENEU) INEGI, Diario Oficial de la Federacion (Mexico), and the NBER U.S. Tariff
Database. a Changes calculated as the difference between the 2000-02 and the 1989-91
averages.  
 
the U.S. schedules13. The reduction in the Mexican import tariff is on average 9.6 
percentage points larger than the change in the U.S. import tariff.  
At an even higher level of disaggregation, tables 5 and 6 list the 50 most and the 50 
less liberalized industries respectively, in terms of reduction in import tariff 
percentage points. For each of these industries, the tables show the 4-digit code used 
by INEGI in the ENEU, a brief description of the industry, the economic sector to 
which they belong, and the percentage point change between the 1989-91 and the 
2000-02 average informality rate and import tariffs. The industries included in table 5  
(table 6) are those that, when sorting all the industries in the sample according to the 
                                                 
13 The Mining sector was nonetheless the one with the lowest levels of pre-NAFTA tariffs. See figure 
3. 
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change of the Mexican and the U.S. import tariffs separately, appear in the top 100 
(bottom 100) in both cases. 
The main things to notice from the ranking in table 5 are the following: first, it is 
dominated by the textiles, apparel & leather economic sector, with 25 industries in 
the list; second, 25 industries experienced a decrease in their rates of informality 
during this period; third, the largest reductions in import tariffs are of approximately 
20 percentage points; and fourth, the change in the Mexican import tariff is on 
average 9.2 percentage points larger than the change in the U.S. import tariff. The 
missing data in the “Informality” column corresponds to industries that did not appear 
in the sample for some of the years considered here.  The tariff and informality 
changes are plotted against each other in figures 4 and 5. The simple regression lines 
fitted in these figures suggest a slightly positive relationship between the reductions in 
imports tariff and the changes in informality. 
Regarding table 6, it can be seen that the Machinery & equipment and the Mining 
sectors dominate the “least liberalized” ranking, with 12 and 10 industries 
respectively. 28 industries had their informality rates reduced, and the largest 
reductions in import tariffs are of approximately 11 percentage points. Notice that for 
many of these industries, the change in the U.S. import tariff is equal to zero because 
they were already fully liberalized in 1989-91, due to the Generalized System of 
Preferences. The decrease in the Mexican import tariff is on average 8.6 percentage 
points larger than the change in the U.S. import tariff. Figures 6 and 7 plot these 
import tariffs changes against the informality changes. The fitted regression lines 
indicate that, unlike the most liberalized industries, changes in the import tariffs are 
now negatively correlated with changes in informality. 
Finally, table 7 offers a look at the evolution of informality in the non-tradable 
sectors14. It shows the percentage point changes from the 1989-91 to the 2000-02 
average rates. The Hotels, restaurants & trade sector is the only one that experienced 
a reduction in informality, of about 0.5 percentage points. The largest increase is of 8 
percentage points for the Financial services & real estate sector. The average change 
in informality in the non-tradable sectors (bottom row in the table) is an increase of 
approximately 3 percentage points. 
                                                 
14 Petroleum & coal extraction is classified as non-tradable because of two reasons: first, it mainly 
refers to petroleum extraction activities and not to the marketing of its outputs (such as oil or gas) 
which are mostly included in the Chemical products sectors; and second, petroleum extraction in 
Mexico is an exclusive activity of the state-own company, PEMEX. 
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Table 5: 50 Most Liberalized Industries
INEGI Code Description Sector Informality Change Mex Change US
105 Fruits Food, beverages & tobacco -0.10 -18.66 -4.08
205 Horses, mules and donkeys Farms, forestry & fishing 0.25 -15.50 -2.08
206 Poultry Farms, forestry & fishing -0.08 -15.28 -5.03
208 Lambs Farms, forestry & fishing . -14.60 -1.96
1112 Cream, butter, cheese Food, beverages & tobacco -0.08 -13.86 -6.72
1201 Dehydrated fruits and vegetables Food, beverages & tobacco -0.09 -18.11 -4.21
1202 Prepared and packed fruits and vegetables Food, beverages & tobacco -0.05 -15.65 -5.62
1602 Piloncillo, Panela or Mascabado Food, beverages & tobacco 0.00 -14.72 -2.15
1611 Ethyl alcohol Food, beverages & tobacco . -18.15 -3.07
1901 Regional candies and jelly Food, beverages & tobacco 0.08 -18.66 -7.64
1903 Candies and chocolates Food, beverages & tobacco -0.06 -18.66 -7.64
1942 Ice cream Food, beverages & tobacco 0.04 -13.52 -14.67
2001 Agave liquors Food, beverages & tobacco -0.41 -20.00 -4.51
2011 Non-fermented alcoholic beverages Food, beverages & tobacco 0.10 -18.15 -3.07
2012 Wines Food, beverages & tobacco 0.16 -19.38 -4.53
2201 Softdrinks and purified water Food, beverages & tobacco 0.03 -17.00 -3.32
2421 Threads Textiles, apparel & leather -0.06 -14.69 -9.00
2432 Cashmeres, cloths and similar products Textiles, apparel & leather 0.04 -14.00 -20.40
2601 Impregnated textiles Textiles, apparel & leather 0.29 -18.07 -4.55
2611 Padding and similar articles Textiles, apparel & leather -0.07 -17.57 -5.41
2612 Carpets and similar articles Textiles, apparel & leather -0.06 -15.60 -3.93
2613 Felts Textiles, apparel & leather 0.50 -20.00 -10.94
2614 Quilted textiles Textiles, apparel & leather -0.21 -16.25 -13.22
2621 Lace and similar articles Textiles, apparel & leather 0.07 -18.15 -10.27
2631 Cotton and bandages Textiles, apparel & leather -0.02 -15.00 -13.48
2641 Tapestry Textiles, apparel & leather -0.10 -18.36 -5.00
2642 Buttons, sequins, and similar articles Textiles, apparel & leather 0.09 -18.86 -15.54
2643 Sheets and tablecloths Textiles, apparel & leather -0.06 -18.99 -7.36
2644 Other textiles Textiles, apparel & leather 0.15 -18.39 -7.82
2701 Socks and tights Textiles, apparel & leather -0.05 -20.00 -16.43
2702 Sweaters and vests Textiles, apparel & leather -0.03 -19.70 -10.27
2703 Knitted articles Textiles, apparel & leather -0.17 -19.25 -15.12
2711 Male cloths, except shirts and uniforms Textiles, apparel & leather -0.06 -18.13 -11.17
2717 Underwear Textiles, apparel & leather . -17.50 -9.29
2721 Hats and caps Textiles, apparel & leather 0.07 -18.33 -9.96
2722 Palm-made hats Textiles, apparel & leather -0.11 -18.00 -11.94
2723 Gloves, handkerchiefs, ties and scarfs Textiles, apparel & leather -0.31 -17.68 -14.00
2801 Tanned leather Textiles, apparel & leather -0.06 -17.55 -14.40
2811 Leather products, exc shoes and clothes Textiles, apparel & leather 0.02 -13.69 -2.86
2812 Non-plastic shoes Textiles, apparel & leather 0.01 -17.50 -15.50
2821 Sandals and similar articles Textiles, apparel & leather 0.19 -18.75 -7.69
2901 Sawmill production Wood products 0.07 -15.02 -2.79
3001 Wooden furniture Wood products -0.01 -15.42 -5.77
3002 Box Spring mattresses Wood products 0.07 -15.00 -12.35
4201 Plastic tubes and contours Chemical products -0.02 -13.46 -3.33
4511 Bricks and tiles Nonmetallic mineral products 0.07 -15.52 -5.20
4512 Refractory products Nonmetallic mineral products 0.14 -14.16 -1.63
5601 Automobiles, trucks and tractors Machinery & equipment -0.01 -13.88 -1.97
5701 Metallic bodyworks and parts Machinery & equipment 0.00 -14.02 -1.98
5902 Watches and clocks Other manufacturing -0.12 -17.37 -2.87
Maximum 0.50 -13.46 -1.63
Minimum -0.41 -20.00 -20.40
Average 0.00 -16.88 -7.68
The change is calculated as the difference between the 2000-2002 and the 1989-1991 averages. The missing observations in the "Informality" column are due to the 
fact that such industries did not appear in the ENEU labour survey for some of the years considered here.  
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Figure 4. Changes in Informality and the Mexican Import Tariff 1989-91 to 2000-02
Most Liberalized Industries
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Figure 5. Changes in Informality and the U.S. Import Tariff 1989-91 to 2000-02
Most Liberalized Industries
y = 0.003x + 0.023
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Table 6: 50 Less Liberalized Industries
INEGI Code Description Sector Informality Change Mex Change US
201 Cattle Farms, forestry & fishing 0.02 -1.85 0.00
203 Sheep Farms, forestry & fishing 0.36 -10.77 -0.10
204 Goats Farms, forestry & fishing -0.10 -5.53 -0.20
207 Milk producer cattle and goats Farms, forestry & fishing -0.19 -7.80 -0.07
413 Other products from the sea Farms, forestry & fishing . -8.00 0.00
501 Coal & graphite Mining -0.06 -6.29 0.00
511 Coke & anthracite Mining . -7.91 0.00
701 Iron extraction Mining -0.02 -3.75 0.00
901 Limestone extraction Mining 0.55 -10.00 0.00
911 Gypsum extraction Mining 0.00 -6.67 0.00
921 Chippings & sand extraction Mining -0.03 -8.19 0.00
931 Extraction of clay, marble, quartz, etc. Mining 0.02 -9.10 -0.05
941 Silica extraction Mining 0.00 -10.00 0.00
1001 Fluorite extraction Mining -0.13 -10.00 0.00
1021 Salt & salt mines Mining -0.16 -10.00 0.00
1411 Corn milling Food, beverages & tobacco -0.01 -6.40 0.00
1801 Food for animals Food, beverages & tobacco 0.03 -7.63 0.00
3023 Wood coffins Wood products -0.13 -9.22 0.00
3025 Other wooden products, exc. furniture Wood products -0.02 -4.58 0.00
3121 Paper made containers Paper & printing 0.15 -7.43 0.00
3122 Cardboard made containers Paper & printing -0.05 -5.51 -0.02
3123 Other paper and cardboard products Paper & printing -0.06 -9.12 0.00
3201 Newspapers & magazines Paper & printing -0.03 -4.53 -0.02
3211 Printing, lithography & bookbinding Paper & printing 0.01 -7.52 0.00
3301 Petroleum refining Chemical products -0.04 -9.90 0.00
3311 Lubricants & additives Chemical products 0.06 -10.99 0.00
3501 Colourings & pigments Chemical products 0.00 -7.73 -0.06
3521 Primary chemical products Chemical products -0.02 -9.99 0.00
3711 Cellulose & synthetic fibres Chemical products 0.03 -9.78 -0.35
3801 Medicines Chemical products 0.01 -9.04 -0.27
3901 Soaps, detergents and similar products Chemical products 0.00 -10.97 0.00
4044 Other chemical products Chemical products 0.15 -11.29 0.00
4401 Hydraulic cement Nonmetallic mineral products -0.03 -10.04 0.00
4521 Gypsum products Nonmetallic mineral products -0.04 -9.39 0.00
4522 Lime Nonmetallic mineral products 0.00 -10.00 0.00
4701 Copper metallurgy and byproducts Primary metals 0.00 -10.16 0.00
4711 Aluminum metallurgy Primary metals -0.09 -8.54 -0.21
4801 Metallic furniture Machinery & equipment -0.06 -9.81 -0.39
4911 Metallic structures, containers & platforms Machinery & equipment -0.01 -10.12 -0.20
5011 Tools for agriculture Machinery & equipment 0.02 -10.83 -0.45
5041 Smelting of nonferrous metallic parts Machinery & equipment -0.04 -11.03 -0.42
5081 Kitchen pans Machinery & equipment 0.11 -7.34 -0.45
5083 Other metallic products Machinery & equipment 0.02 -9.74 -0.28
5112 M&E for the food industry Machinery & equipment 0.12 -10.89 0.00
5151 Nonelectric extinguishers & pumps Machinery & equipment 0.05 -10.07 -0.43
5171 Sewing machines Machinery & equipment -0.07 -10.87 0.00
5211 Electric industrial M&E Machinery & equipment -0.01 -11.06 -0.20
5301 Electric apparatuses and parts Machinery & equipment -0.04 -8.58 -0.11
5801 Ships Machinery & equipment -0.04 -10.18 0.00
5922 Candles Other manufacturing 0.21 -10.06 -0.17
Maximum 0.55 -1.85 0.00
Minimum -0.19 -11.29 -0.45
Average 0.01 -8.72 -0.09
The change is calculated as the difference between the 2000-2002 and the 1989-1991 averages. The missing observations in the "Informality" column are due to the 
fact that such industries did not appear in the ENEU labour survey for some of the years considered here.  
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Figure 6. Changes in Informality and the Mexican Import Tariff 1989-91 to 2000-02
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y = -0.0103x - 0.080
        [0.008]   [0.073]
-0.30
-0.20
-0.10
0.00
0.10
0.20
0.30
0.40
0.50
0.60
-12.00 -10.00 -8.00 -6.00 -4.00 -2.00 0.00
Change in Import Tariff (percentage points)
C
ha
ng
e 
in
 In
fo
rm
al
ity
 (p
er
ce
nt
ag
e 
po
in
ts
)
 
 
 
 
Figure 7. Changes in Informality and the U.S. Import Tariff 1989-91 to 2000-02 
Less Liberalized Industries
y = -0.028x + 0.007
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Sector 1989-91 to 2000-02a
Petroleoum & coal extraction 5.4
Construction 2.1
Electricity, gas & water 1.8
Hotels, restaurants & trade -0.5
Transport & storage 2.3
Financial services & real estate 8.0
Personal, professional and social services 1.7
Maximum 8.0
Minimum -0.5
Average 3.0
Table 7:  Changes in Rates of Informality for the Non-tradable Sectors 
(Percentage Points)
Source: author's calculations based on the Mexican National Survey of Urban Labour (ENEU)
INEGI, Diario Oficial de la Federacion (Mexico), and the NBER U.S. Tariff Database. a 
Changes calculated as the difference between the 2000-02 and the 1989-91 averages.
 
 
In sum, the main conclusions from this preliminary analysis are the following: 
 
- When looking at the average informality rate and import tariffs (figure 2), it is not 
clear that trade liberalization affects in some way the level of informality. At this 
stage, it is impossible to distinguish the effect of tariff elimination from an 
apparent change in the permanent level of informality and the effect of the 
Mexican financial crisis of 1995. 
- The analysis of the data for the tradable sectors separately (figure 3) suggests that 
trade liberalization may have helped in reducing the rate of informality in some 
sectors more than in others, such as the Primary metals and Farm, forestry & 
fishing sectors. 
- The statistics in table 4 show that the Mining sector is the one with the largest 
increase in informality and the smallest reduction in tariffs. However, there is not 
enough evidence of a linear and positive relationship between the level of the 
tariffs and informality across sectors since, for example, the sector with the largest 
tariff cuts (Textiles, apparel & leather) is not the one with the largest decrease in 
informality. Regarding the non-tradable sectors, table 7 shows that the average 
informality rate increased by about 3 percentage points during the period of study. 
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- Finally, the industry level data in tables 5 and 6 indicate that 50% of the most 
liberalized and 56% of the less liberalized industries experienced a decrease in 
their rates of informality between 1989 and 2002. The summary statistics at the 
bottom of these tables show that the average informality rate for the less 
liberalized industries increased by 0.01 percentage points more than that for the 
most liberalized ones. This could be suggesting that the larger the tariff cut, the 
more helpful trade liberalization becomes in reducing these rates. 
 
 
6. Trade Liberalization and Informality: Econometric Analysis 
 
Even though useful, the evidence presented in the previous section is inconclusive and 
a deeper analysis of the effect of trade liberalization on informality is required. This 
section aims at studying this relationship in a more formal way. The main strategy 
implemented here is a two-stage estimation process based on the one used by 
Goldberg, P. K. and N. Pavcnik (2003). The first step involves the estimation of a 
linear probability model of the form: 
 
ijtjtijtHtijtijt ipIHy εβ ++= *        (7) 
 
where ijty  is an indicator that takes the value of 1 if worker i in industry j at time t is 
employed in the informal sector, and it is equal to 0 if he is employed in the formal 
sector; ijtH  is a vector of worker characteristics such as years of schooling, a 
quadratic term on years of experience, marital status, gender, position within the 
household (whether he is the head of the family or not), and geographic location; ijtI  
is a set of industry dummies that indicate worker i’s industry affiliation; and ijtε  is the 
error term. The coefficients jtip  capture the part of the variation in informal 
employment that cannot be explained by worker characteristics, but that is attributable 
to worker i’s industry affiliation. These coefficients should reflect the influence of any 
change in the market conditions at the industry level such as import tariff elimination, 
given that these tariffs are the same for all the firms in a particular industry. For this 
reason, they are the adequate measure of informality to link with the trade data. 
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Following Goldberg & Pavcnik, these coefficients are denoted industry informality 
differentials. Equation (7) is estimated separately for each year in the sample.  
In the second stage, these industry informality differentials are pooled over time and 
regressed on the Mexican import tariff, the U.S. import tariff, a set of industry and 
time indicators, and a set of interactions between the industry dummies and a time 
trend. A weighted least squares estimation is used, with weights equal to the inverse 
of the variance of the informality differentials from the first stage. 
Because of the rotating panel structure of the ENEU survey described in section 4, a 
fifth of the sample in any year appears as well in the following one, and this might be 
a source of autocorrelation for the error term in the second stage model. To account 
for this, the standard errors are computed using the Newey-West method with one lag. 
Regarding the first stage, Huber/White/sandwich standard errors clustered at the 
industry level are estimated in all the regressions. 
 
6.1. First Stage Results 
 
Apart from providing the estimates of the industry informality differentials, the first 
stage estimation is also useful to study the determinants of informal labour at the 
individual level. The results are reported in table 8. As expected from the human 
capital theory, the probability of being informal decreases with years of experience 
and schooling. It is also lower for married workers, but not for those cohabitating with 
a partner without being married. Males seem to be more likely to be informal than 
females. This result does not seem to support what Roberts, B. R. (1989) finds for the 
labour market of Guadalajara, but it is consistent with Goldberg, P. K. & N. Pavcnik 
(2003) findings for Colombia. The table also shows that the likelihood of informality 
is significantly lower for the head of the household and higher for the second provider 
of income in the family (secondhead). This seems to be a reasonable result if one 
considers that, as found by Roberts, B. R. (1989) and argued by Maloney, W. F. 
(1999), the deductions made for welfare in formal employment are perceived as a 
disadvantage by many workers. Since social welfare in Mexico normally covers not 
only the worker but his family as well, there is no benefit for the second provider of 
income to work in the formal sector and pay the welfare deductions to get his own 
social insurance, as he is already covered by the one from the head of the household. 
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Table 8: Linear Probability Model for Informality
1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
experience -0.003 *** -0.003 *** -0.002 * -0.002 *** -0.003 *** -0.002 ** -0.002 ** -0.003 *** -0.003 *** -0.003 ** -0.002 ** -0.002 * -0.002 -0.002
[0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001]
experience2 0.00008 *** 0.00008 *** 0.00007 *** 0.00008 *** 0.00009 *** 0.00008 *** 0.00008 *** 0.00008 *** 0.00009 *** 0.00009 *** 0.00009 *** 0.00009 *** 0.00008 *** 0.00008 ***
[0.00001] [0.00002] [0.00002] [0.00002] [0.00002] [0.00001] [0.00002] [0.00002] [0.00002] [0.00001] [0.00002] [0.00002] [0.00001] [0.00001]
schooling -0.006 ** -0.005 ** -0.004 -0.006 ** -0.006 ** -0.005 -0.005 * -0.006 ** -0.005 ** -0.008 *** -0.007 *** -0.007 *** -0.007 *** -0.007 **
[0.003] [0.002] [0.003] [0.003] [0.003] [0.003] [0.003] [0.002] [0.002] [0.003] [0.003] [0.003] [0.003] [0.003]
married -0.018 -0.018 * -0.008 -0.014 -0.011 -0.020 *** -0.017 *** -0.022 *** -0.018 *** -0.020 *** -0.017 ** -0.017 ** -0.018 *** -0.010
[0.011] [0.011] [0.009] [0.009] [0.009] [0.006] [0.006] [0.005] [0.007] [0.006] [0.007] [0.006] [0.006] [0.007]
cohabitating 0.015 ** 0.010 0.010 0.016 ** 0.007 0.005 -0.002 -0.004 0.003 0.002 0.005 0.007 -0.001 0.005
[0.007] [0.010] [0.008] [0.006] [0.008] [0.008] [0.007] [0.007] [0.005] [0.005] [0.004] [0.005] [0.004] [0.004]
male 0.045 *** 0.045 *** 0.040 *** 0.043 *** 0.032 *** 0.028 ** 0.027 ** 0.028 ** 0.023 * 0.024 * 0.015 0.011 0.011 0.011
[0.011] [0.011] [0.012] [0.012] [0.013] [0.013] [0.013] [0.013] [0.014] [0.013] [0.014] [0.015] [0.016] [0.016]
firsthead -0.029 ** -0.017 * -0.028 *** -0.032 *** -0.031 *** -0.027 *** -0.039 *** -0.041 *** -0.040 *** -0.034 *** -0.028 *** -0.036 *** -0.023 *** -0.029 ***
[0.012] [0.010] [0.009] [0.011] [0.011] [0.010] [0.011] [0.012] [0.011] [0.009] [0.007] [0.007] [0.006] [0.007]
secondhead 0.063 *** 0.063 *** 0.056 *** 0.061 *** 0.067 *** 0.062 *** 0.051 *** 0.056 *** 0.054 *** 0.061 *** 0.054 *** 0.049 *** 0.056 *** 0.049 ***
[0.017] [0.019] [0.019] [0.019] [0.016] [0.019] [0.016] [0.014] [0.013] [0.013] [0.012] [0.012] [0.013] [0.011]
ln(population) 0.013 0.015 0.007 0.001 -0.014 * -0.014 -0.013 -0.001 0.673 0.002 0.0003 0.0002 0.007 *** 0.002
[0.009] [0.011] [0.011] [0.008] [0.008] [0.009] [0.008] [0.006] [1.603] [0.008] [0.003] [0.003] [0.003] [0.002]
relative distance 0.010 0.014 0.030 0.026 0.054 ** 0.054 * 0.076 *** 0.030 -2.981 0.057 ** 0.041 * 0.031 0.035 0.106 ***
[0.024] [0.020] [0.019] [0.024] [0.025] [0.032] [0.025] [0.025] [7.241] [0.028] [0.025] [0.022] [0.027] [0.024]
high exposure 0.010 0.0006 -0.002 -0.002 -0.076 ** -0.108 *** -0.076 *** -0.043 ** 2.141 -0.070 *** -0.099 *** -0.103 *** -0.143 *** -0.088 ***
[0.023] [0.019] [0.020] [0.017] [0.031] [0.030] [0.022] [0.017] [5.209] [0.018] [0.024] [0.030] [0.030] [0.023]
low exposure 0.010 0.079 *** 0.013 -0.001 -0.069 *** -0.086 * -0.064 0.026 2.357 -0.023 -0.104 *** -0.091 *** -0.068 ** -0.082 ***
[0.023] [0.025] [0.029] [0.024] [0.024] [0.050] [0.041] [0.026] [5.605] [0.028] [0.033] [0.031] [0.026] [0.025]
No. Obs. 60,334 62,441 63,082 114,637 123,460 126,976 130,054 138,384 147,271 153,622 173,095 183,999 190,405 184,229
***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. All regressions include city and industry dummies. Robust standard errors clustered at the industry level are shown in brackets.
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Sector Average 1989-20021
Farms, forestry & fishing 0.699
Mining 0.673
Food, beverage & tobacco 0.830
Textiles, apparel & leather 0.594
Wood products 0.909
Paper & printing 0.862
Chemical products 0.492
Nonmetallic mineral products 0.886
Primary metals 0.180
Machinery & equipment 0.767
Other manufacturing 0.651
Non-Tradable 0.920
Maximum 0.920
Minimum 0.180
Average 0.705
Table 9: Average Year-to-Year Correlations of Estimated 
Informality Differentials by Sector
1 Average correlation coefficients at the sector level of the industry
informality differentials estimated with the linear probability model in the
first stage.  
 
Regarding the geographic characteristics, the probability of informality appears to be 
positively correlated with the natural logarithm of the population of the city were the 
worker lives, and also with the proximity to Mexico City (relative distance). 
However, the estimated coefficients are statistically significant only for a few years of 
the sample. Finally, the estimates indicate that the likelihood of informality is 
significantly lower for workers living in a state with high exposure to globalization  
(for 9 years of the sample) and higher for those living in a state with low exposure to 
it (for 8 years of the sample).  
Although not reported, the regressions in the first stage also included a set of city 
dummy variables. In most of the cases these indicators were individually and jointly 
statistically significant, suggesting that geographic location is an important 
determinant of the likelihood of informality. Also, as for Brazil and Colombia in 
Goldberg, P. K. & N. Pavcnik (2003), the estimated informality differentials (i.e. the 
coefficients of the industry dummies) are correlated through time, with the year-to-
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year correlation coefficients ranging from 0.74 to 0.95, and averaging 0.85. Table 9 
breaks down these correlations by economic sector. The highest coefficients are those 
for the Non-tradable, Wood products, Non-metallic mineral products and Paper & 
Printing sectors; and the lowest ones are those for the Primary Metals, Chemical 
products, and Textiles, apparel & leather sectors. A high (low) year-to-year 
correlation could be indicative of a low (high) sensitivity of the likelihood of 
informality to changes in the level of import tariffs. 
 
6.2. Second Stage Results 
 
After controlling for individual characteristics and city fixed effects, the next step in 
this estimation procedure is to pool the informality differentials over time and to 
relate them to the import tariffs data. The estimated equation is of the following form: 
 ( ) jttrDtjDjYtTjtjt trDDYTip εφδγβ +×+++= × )(     (8) 
 
where jtip  is the informality differential for industry j at time t, jtT  is the matrix of 
Mexican and U.S. import tariffs, tY  is a matrix of year indicators, jD  is a matrix of 
industry indicators, ( )tj trD ×  refers to the set of interactions between the industry 
dummies and a time trend, and jtε  is the error term. Identification of Tβ  therefore 
comes from within-industry fluctuations of T  around a time trend. A Mexican and 
U.S. tariff of 0% is artificially assigned to the non-tradable industries, so that these 
industries are not dropped from the sample. In this way, these observations do not 
contribute to the estimation of the coefficients in Tβ  but they are useful in getting 
more precise estimates of the year effects Yγ . The year indicators are included to 
remove the aggregate variation from all the other variables in the right-hand side of 
equation (8), like the tariff variables. Likewise, industry indicators are included to 
control for unobserved industry characteristics that may be constant through time. The 
inclusion of the interactions between the industry dummies and the trend accounts for 
the possibility that different industries may follow different paths through time, for 
example due to factors such as the Mexican crisis (by which export oriented industries 
benefited more from a depreciation of the peso than other industries). 
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Apart from using the standard import tariffs, the effect of trade liberalization on 
informality can also be estimated by using an input-output matrix to calculate an 
 import tariff that reflects the taxes payable on imported inputs more precisely. The 
input-output matrix shows the intersectoral transactions at current producer prices, 
which can be expressed as shares of the total output of each sector. These shares are 
then used to construct a weighted tariff that reflects the interdependence of sectors in 
the production process. For example, suppose that the inputs that the Mining sector 
obtains from the Machinery & equipment sector represent 25% of its total output, the 
inputs from the Chemical products represent another 25%, and the rest of the inputs 
are obtained internally. If the average sector import tariffs were 15%, 20%, and 10% 
respectively, the weighted tariff for the Mining sector would be: 
 ( ) ( ) ( ) 1375.010.050.020.025.015.025.0 =×+×+×     (9) 
 
or 13.75%. Furthermore, the input-output matrix also contains the share of imported 
inputs for each sector. Assuming for example that 35% of all inputs used in the 
Mining sector are imported, its weighted tariff (from now on the IOM tariff) becomes 
4.81% (that is 0.1375 times 0.35 times 100). Therefore, apart from summarizing the 
intersectoral dependence, the IOM tariff also reflects the relative importance of 
imports across sectors.  Among the virtues of this tariff, it makes now possible to 
assign a real import tariff to the non-tradable sectors, because of their interactions 
with the tradable ones. Its disadvantage is that the input-output matrix data for Mexico 
is not publicly available at the industry level, so this tariff can only be calculated at 
the sector level. Nevertheless, this alternative approach is explored here, as it might be 
useful to shed more light in understanding the effect of trade liberalization on 
informality for the whole economy. There are four matrices available and 
unfortunately the most recent one is from 198015. The weights used to generate the 
IOM tariff are the average weights derived from these matrices (1970, 1975, 1978 and 
1980). Although these do not capture the evolution of the intersectoral relationships 
between 1989 and 2002 (which might have been affected by the trade liberalization 
process) they should at least reflect their historical interactions. 
 
                                                 
15 The matrices were originally generated by the Mexican central bank, and later on by INEGI. The 
publicly available versions contain aggregated data for 18 economic sectors. They can be found at 
http://www.inegi.gob.mx/est/default.asp?c=1629 .  
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Table 10. Effect of Trade Liberalization on Informality
(a) (b) (c)
Mex Tariff 0.392 *** 0.504 *** 0.283 ***
[0.128] [0.133] [0.077]
No. Obs. 4737 4403 4403
US Tariff -0.144 -0.086 -0.124
[0.252] [0.193] [0.163]
No. Obs. 4697 4376 4360
IOM Tariff 0.080 ** 0.058 0.044 **
[0.037] [0.036] [0.022]
No. Obs. 4737 4403 4403
Mex Tariff 0.338 ** 0.491 *** 0.275 ***
[0.144] [0.144] [0.085]
US Tariff -0.139 -0.123 -0.148
[0.249] [0.190] [0.162]
IOM Tariff 0.042 0.007 0.011
[0.042] [0.038] [0.024]
No. Obs. 4697 4376 4360
(a) Current tariffs
(b) 1-year lagged tariffs
(c) Sum of current and 1-year lagged tariffs
***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. All
regressions include year dummies, industry dummies and industry trends. Newey-
West standard errors with 1 lag are shown in brackets.
1
2
4
3
 
 
Finally, as mentioned above, equation (8) is estimated using weighted least squares 
with weights equal to the inverse of the variance of the informality differentials from 
the first stage, and the standard errors are computed using the Newey-West method 
with one lag. 
Table 10 reports the estimates of equation (8). Column (a) presents the estimates 
obtained for the current values of the import tariffs. When the informality differentials 
are regressed on each one of the tariffs separately (panels 1 to 3) it can be seen that 
both the Mexican and the IOM tariffs have positive and significant coefficients. Panel 
1 indicates that a 1-percentage point decline in the current Mexican import tariff 
reduces the probability of informality in a given industry by 0.392 percentage points. 
This effect falls to 0.338 when the three import tariffs are used together in the 
regression of panel 4, but remains statistically significant at a 5% level. The 
significance of the IOM coefficient is lost in this last specification. 
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Column (b) explores the possibility that adjustments in the likelihood of informality 
with respect to changes in the level of import tariffs may require some time to take 
place. Using the 1-year lagged values instead, the column reports larger effects for the 
Mexican tariff and smaller ones for the U.S. and the IOM tariffs. Only the first one is 
statistically significant. According to panel 4, a 1-percentage point decrease in the 
Mexican import tariff is related to a 0.491 percentage point reduction in the 
probability of informality. 
The last column in the table uses the sum of the current and the 1-year lagged tariffs 
as regressors, so as to summarize the dynamic effects found in the other two. The 
estimates confirm the importance of the Mexican import tariff. Panel 4 indicates that a 
two-year cumulated reduction of 1-percentage point in this tariff generates a 0.275 
percentage point reduction in the probability of informality.  A significant effect for 
the IOM tariff is also obtained when this is used separately as regressor, but it is not 
robust to the inclusion of the other tariffs in the equation. 
All the estimated coefficients for the U.S. import tariff are not significantly different 
from zero, and this is likely to be the case if one recalls that the U.S. tariffs on 
Mexican imports were already low before NAFTA due to the GSP (see previous 
section), and that it is precisely the Mexican import tariff the one that is changing the 
most after 1994. As for the IOM tariff, the estimates in table 10 are all of positive 
sign, and this would in principle support hypothesis (a) in section 2: lower Mexican 
import tariffs would allow Mexican firms to obtain cheaper inputs, machinery and 
equipment from the United States, which could lead to an increase in productivity and 
to a reduction of informality. However, the fact that the estimated coefficients for this 
tariff are not statistically significant for any of the regressions in panel 4 may also 
indicate that the effect of trade liberalization has not spread throughout the non-
tradable sectors. 
Another possibility worth exploring is that trade liberalization may have different 
effects on the rate of informality in industries with different degrees of exposure to 
trade. For example, an export oriented industry may benefit more from the elimination 
of the U.S. import tariff than other industries, or perhaps an industry with a relatively 
high share of imported inputs or means of production benefits more from the 
elimination of the Mexican import tariff. To see if this is the case, equation (8) is 
modified in order to include a set of interactions between the tariffs and the following 
measures of exposure to trade: 
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Table 11:  Exposure to Trade By Sector
1994-2002 Average Values
Sector Exportera Importerb Import Penetrationc
Mining 0.001 0.001 0.021
Food, beverage & tobacco 0.053 0.037 0.451
Textiles, apparel & leather 0.120 0.056 0.603
Wood products 0.102 0.035 0.385
Paper & printing 0.040 0.103 1.160
Chemical products 0.128 0.060 0.504
Nonmetallic mineral products 0.128 0.036 0.622
Primary metals 0.246 0.112 0.364
Machinery & equipment 0.227 0.078 24.983
Other manufacturing 0.147 0.066 1.768
Maximum 0.246 0.112 24.983
Minimum 0.001 0.001 0.021
Average 0.119 0.058 3.086
Source: author's calculations based on the Annual Industrial Survey (INEGI). a Net sales in foreign
markets as a share of the market value of total output. b Share of machinery and equipment of production
that is imported directly. c Imports of final products as a share of the market value of total output.
 
- Exporter, an industry’s net sales in foreign markets as a share of the market value 
of its total output.  
- Importer, the share of an industry’s machinery and equipment of production that 
is imported directly.  
- Import Penetration, an industry’s imports of final products as a share of the 
market value of its total output. 
 
The data used to generate the first two measures comes from the Annual Industrial 
Survey, carried out by INEGI, and which objective is to generate information about 
the trends of the main economic variables of the national manufacturing sector. 
INEGI follows a non-probabilistic sampling procedure to determine the group of 
manufacturing plants that will be surveyed. It excludes maquiladoras, basic 
petrochemical plants, refineries, and also micro-industry plants (i.e. plants with less 
than 15 employees). Among other things, this source contains annual measures of 
total employment, remunerations, operating costs, output, sales, income, assets, and 
depreciation for industries in the manufacturing sectors. The sample available for this 
study covers the period 1994 through 2002, and it is aggregated at the 6-digit level, 
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following the International Standard Industrial Classification. The data on final 
product imports used in constructing the third variable comes from the international 
trade statistics generated by the BANXICO-INEGI-SAT-Secretariat of Economy 
work group, and that is publicly available from INEGI16. The period covered is 1993 
through 2002. The three variables were calculated for each industry in each available 
year. Table 11 summarizes these measures at the sector level. The Primary metals 
sector is the one with the highest levels of relative exports and imports of machinery 
and equipment, while the Mining sector is the one with the lowest levels. Regarding 
import penetration, the Machinery & equipment, Other manufacturing and Paper & 
printing sectors seem to import more final products than the ones they produce 
domestically. 
The 1994-2002 industry averages of these variables were multiplied by the import 
tariffs to generate interactions for the whole 1989-2002 period. These new covariates 
are included in the estimation of an equation like the one in (8). The results are 
reported in table 12. The estimates for the current values of the tariffs in column (a) 
indicate that for a given reduction in the Mexican import tariff, the rate of informality 
decreases less in industries with higher levels of import penetration than in other 
industries. This may be so because those industries were already under strong foreign 
competition before NAFTA and had previously adjusted their levels of informal 
workers, or maybe because this foreign competition increased with NAFTA, forcing 
some firms in those industries to increase their informal labour force instead of 
reducing it. Also, the elimination of the U.S. import tariff helps in reducing the rate of 
informality in industries that are relatively more export oriented. Firms for which the 
main market is the U.S. benefit more from the elimination of the U.S. import tariffs 
on Mexican products than firms for which the main market is the domestic one.  
Regarding the IOM tariff, there is a modest positive effect of trade liberalization on 
informality for industries with a higher degree of import penetration.  
The results for the 1-year lagged values in column (b) indicate that these effects are 
only contemporary, as none of the estimated coefficients for the interactions is 
significantly different from zero. Finally, the estimates for the two-year cumulated  
 
                                                 
16 BANXICO is the Mexican Central Bank and SAT is the Tax System Administration. Data available 
in Banco de Información Económica, INEGI’s website: http://dgcnesyp.inegi.gob.mx/cgi-
win/bdieintsi.exe/NIVJ1001640016#ARBOL.  
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Table 12. Informality and Exposure to Trade
(a) (b) (c)
Mex Tariff 0.334 * 0.613 *** 0.328 ***
[0.200] [0.208] [0.123]
Mex Tariff * Importer 0.095 -2.379 -0.905
[2.321] [2.217] [1.331]
Mex Tariff * Imp.Penetration -0.015 ** -0.009 -0.007
[0.007] [0.009] [0.005]
US Tariff -0.527 * -0.308 -0.448 **
[0.291] [0.229] [0.203]
US Tariff * Exporter 5.922 ** 3.181 3.907 ***
[2.364] [1.976] [1.493]
IOM Tariff 0.039 -0.026 -0.010
[0.060] [0.054] [0.034]
IOM Tariff * Importer 0.010 0.592 0.306
[0.486] [0.415] [0.262]
IOM Tariff * Imp.Penetration 0.002 ** 0.001 0.0009 *
[0.0008] [0.001] [0.0005]
No. Obs. 4697 4376 4360
(a) Current tariffs
(b) 1-year lagged tariffs
(c) Sum of current and 1-year lagged tariffs
***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. All regressions include year
dummies, industry dummies and industry trends. Newey-West standard errors with 1 lag are shown in
brackets.
 
 
tariffs in column (c) confirm the importance of most of the effects identified in 
column (a). 
The last part of the analysis in this section consists of looking at the impact of trade 
liberalization on the industry’s employment share, the composition of informality (i.e. 
its effect on self-employment, informal salaried, and unpaid workers, separately), and 
the size of the labour force of firms. The employment share of a particular industry is 
measured as its fraction of total employment in the economy. As described in section 
4, self-employment is measured as those persons in an industry that run a firm of 6 or 
less employees and that do not have any kind of social or health insurance. Similarly, 
the informal salaried are the persons that work for a firm of any size and that do not 
have any kind of social or health insurance. Likewise, the unpaid workers are the 
workers that do not receive any kind of payment. Finally, firm’s labour force size is 
measured as the natural logarithm of the total labour force in the industry’s average  
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Table 13. Effect of Trade Liberalization on Employment Shares, Composition of Informality, and the Size of Firms
Mex Tariff -0.010 0.392 *** 0.219 ** 0.096 0.077 -0.312
[0.021] [0.128] [0.092] [0.102] [0.059] [0.346]
No. Obs. 4746 4737 4737 4737 4737 4732
US Tariff -0.033 * -0.144 -0.312 * 0.451 ** -0.283 *** -0.840
[0.020] [0.252] [0.173] [0.182] [0.108] [0.699]
No. Obs. 4706 4697 4697 4697 4697 4692
IOM Tariff -0.488 0.080 ** 0.048 * 0.008 0.024 * -0.332
[0.758] [0.037] [0.027] [0.029] [0.013] [9.254]
No. Obs. 4746 4737 4737 4737 4737 4732
Mex Tariff -0.001 0.338 ** 0.185 * 0.097 0.056 -0.400
[0.011] [0.144] [0.099] [0.113] [0.070] [0.449]
US Tariff -0.031 * -0.139 -0.308 * 0.449 ** -0.279 *** -0.761
[0.017] [0.249] [0.173] [0.180] [0.109] [0.707]
IOM Tariff -0.451 0.042 0.025 0.0002 0.016 7.711
[0.669] [0.042] [0.029] [0.033] [0.017] [12.029]
No. Obs. 4706 4697 4697 4697 4697 4692
1
Informal 
Salaried
3
4
***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. All regressions include year dummies, industry dummies and industry trends. 1All the
estimates are obtained using weighted least squares, with weights equal to the number of observations available for each industry-year. Newey-West standard errors with
1 lag are shown in brackets.
Unpaid   
Workers
ln(Labour 
Force)1
Total 
Informality
2
Employment 
Share1
Self-Employment
 
 
firm, and it is estimated from the data collected by the ENEU survey when the 
interviewed workers are asked about the total number of people in their workplaces.  
The industry’s employment share and the average firm’s labour force size are 
computed for each industry in each year of the sample, and are then regressed on the 
import tariffs using the model in equation (8). For the cases of self-employment, 
informal salaried and unpaid workers, the econometric strategy is the same two-stage 
procedure as the one used for total informality above. The results are reported in table 
13. The estimates in the first column indicate that trade liberalization has generated 
some labour force reallocations across industries through the elimination of the U.S. 
import tariff on Mexican products: a 1-percentage point reduction in this tariff 
increases an industry’s employment share by 0.033 percentage points. This result is 
consistent with the theory in Melitz (2003), as it would suggest that the new profit 
opportunities in the U.S. market induce firms in more liberalized industries to increase 
their labour demand.  
The second to fifth columns in table 13 refer to the composition of informality. The 
second column is simply repeating column (a) from table 10, in order to compare it 
with the results for each type of informality separately. The third to fifth columns 
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present these results. They indicate two main things: first, that a 1-percentage point 
reduction in the Mexican import tariff on U.S. products reduces informal self-
employment by 0.185 percentage points, and it does not seem to affect significantly 
the probability of becoming an informal salaried or an unpaid worker. Second, they 
also indicate that a 1-percentage point reduction in the U.S. import tariff increases the 
likelihood of informal self-employment and unpaid work by 0.308 and 0.279 
percentage points respectively, while it reduces the probability of informal salaried 
employment by 0.449 percentage points. Even though the coefficient for the U.S. 
tariff is larger (in absolute terms) than the coefficient from the Mexican tariff in the 
case of the informal self-employed, the overall effect of trade liberalization on this 
type of informality is very likely to be determined by the second one because, as 
shown in table 1, the average Mexican tariff is higher than the U.S. one for every year 
in the sample. 
Also, given that the effect of trade liberalization on total informality is mainly through 
the elimination of the Mexican import tariff (as shown in the second column of table 
13), the consequence of the reduction in the U.S. tariffs seems to be principally a 
reallocation of workers within the informal sector. That is, while the elimination of 
the Mexican tariff increases the incentives for people in the informal self-employment 
sub-sector to move into the formal sector, the elimination of the U.S. tariff may be 
simply inducing people in the informal salaried sub-sector to move into the informal 
self-employment and the unpaid work sub-sectors.  
A possible interpretation of these results could be the following. Trade liberalization 
makes it more attractive for owners of firms to become formal, as it is only through 
formality that they can take advantage of the cheaper and better inputs, machinery or 
equipment produced in the U.S. (because formal firms are the only ones that can get 
involved in trade). Owners of firms in the informal sector are concentrated either in 
the self-employment or in the unpaid work sub-sectors (regarding the unpaid workers, 
about 97% of the people in this category works for a family business, and the median 
age is approximately 23 years17. A good example of this type of worker could then be 
a student that helps his parents running a family-owned restaurant every day after 
classes). Thus, when trade liberalization takes place, those informal employees that 
could either run their own informal firm or work in a family business instead of being 
                                                 
17 Average values calculated from the 1989-2002, April-June ENEU interviews. 
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employed by someone else would be more attracted to move into self-employment or 
into unpaid work in the family business, as the potential profits that they could derive 
from those activities are now greater due to the lower trade costs. In other words, 
within the informal sector, trade liberalization could be making more profitable to 
become an entrepreneur than to remain employed in someone else’s firm as an 
informal salaried. 
Finally, the last column in table 13 shows the estimates from regressing the natural 
logarithm of the size of the average firm’s labour force. Trade liberalization does not 
seem to have any significant effect on the size of the labour force, at least as reported 
by interviewed workers.  
Summing up, the econometric analysis in this section shows the following 
conclusions: 
 
- From the first stage results, the probability of informal employment decreases 
with years of experience and schooling. It is also lower for married and female 
workers. Within a household, the likelihood of informality is significantly lower 
for the first provider of income and significantly higher for the second provider, 
which supports the results of Roberts, B. R. (1989) and Maloney, W. F. (1999). 
- Regarding geographic location, the results imply that the probability of 
informality varies significantly across cities. It is also higher for workers that live 
closer to Mexico City than to the U.S.-Mexico border, and lower for workers 
living in a state with high exposure to globalization, as defined by Hanson, G. H. 
(2004). 
- Industry affiliation is also an important determinant of informality. As for Brazil 
and Colombia in Goldberg, P. K. & N. Pavcnik (2003), the estimated informality 
differentials are correlated through time, particularly in the Non-tradable, Wood 
products, Non-metallic mineral products and Paper & Printing sectors. 
- From the second stage results, the estimates suggest a significant effect of trade 
liberalization on the probability of informal employment. Specifically, a 1-
percentage point decline in the Mexican import tariff is associated with a 0.392 
percentage point reduction in the likelihood of informality. The U.S. import tariff 
does not seem to have a significant effect, which is a reasonable outcome 
considering its already low level in the pre-NAFTA period.  The analysis also 
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suggests that the benefits of trade liberalization have not spread over to the labour 
force in the non-tradable sectors in a statistically significant sense. 
- When the import tariffs are interacted with different measures of exposure to trade 
for the manufacturing sectors, the analysis indicates that for a given reduction in 
the Mexican import tariff, informality decreases less in industries with higher 
levels of import penetration. Likewise, the elimination of the U.S. import tariff 
helps in reducing the rate of informality in industries that are relatively more 
export oriented. 
- Finally, trade liberalization affects the employment shares and the composition of 
informality across industries, but it does not seem to have an impact on the size of 
the firm’s labour force. The level of the U.S. import tariff is negatively related to 
the industry’s share of total employment. The elimination of the Mexican import 
tariff reduces self-employment in the tradable industries, and the elimination of 
the U.S. import tariff seems to have a reallocation effect within the informal 
labour force, from informal salaried to either self-employment or unpaid work. 
 
Overall, the econometric analysis provides supporting evidence for the hypothesis that 
the tariff elimination process undertaken by Mexico when joining NAFTA in 1994 
has helped in reducing the incidence of informality. The next section studies the effect 
of trade liberalization on the industry wage differentials and the intra-industry formal-
informal wage gap. 
 
 
7. Trade Liberalization and Wages 
 
The analysis in the previous section shows that trade liberalization in Mexico is 
significantly related to reductions in the probability of informal employment within 
the tradable economic sectors. This finding provides empirical support for one of the 
implications of the theoretical model discussed in section 2. This section analyzes the 
effect of tariff elimination on wages and the formal-informal wage differential.  
The econometric analysis here starts by estimating the effect of import tariffs 
elimination on industry wage differentials, in order to complement the results of 
previous studies with the ENEU data. A two-stage approach similar to the one used 
for informality in the previous section is implemented. The first step consists of 
estimating a log-wage equation of the following form: 
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ijtjtijtHtijtijt ipIHwage εβ ++= *lg            (10) 
 
where ijtwagelg  is the natural logarithm of the wage for worker i in industry j at time 
t, ijtH  is a vector of worker characteristics and geographic location variables, ijtI  is a 
set of industry dummies that indicate worker i’s industry affiliation, and ijtε  is the 
error term. The coefficients jtip  capture the part of the variation in wages that is 
attributable to worker i’s industry affiliation. These coefficients are denoted industry 
wage differentials and they capture the difference in wages that is attributable to 
industry affiliation. Equation (10) is estimated separately for each year in the sample. 
As with informality, in the second stage these industry wage differentials are pooled 
over time and regressed on the Mexican import tariff, the U.S. import tariff, the IOM 
tariff, a set of industry and time indicators, and a set of interactions between the 
industry dummies and a time trend. A weighted least squares estimation is used, with 
weights equal to the inverse of the variance of the wage differentials from the first 
stage. 
The results for the first stage are reported in table 14. They indicate that wages 
increase with years of experience and schooling, are higher for married people and for  
those cohabitating with a partner. They are also higher for males, for the head of the 
household and for the second provider of income, when compared to the other 
members of the family. Regarding the geographic characteristics, the estimates show 
that earnings increase with the population size of the city in which the worker lives, 
that they are higher for people living in states with high and low exposure to 
globalization than for those living in states with an intermediate level of exposure, and 
that they are higher in places closer to the U.S.-Mexico border than to Mexico City, 
which agrees with the findings of Hanson, G. H. (2003). Although not reported, the 
regressions in table 14 also included a set of city dummies, which in most of the cases 
where both individually and jointly significant. The estimated industry wage 
differentials are correlated through time, but not as strongly as the informality 
differentials in the previous section. The year-to-year correlation coefficients range 
from 0.29 to 0.80 and averaging 0.55. This suggests that wages could be highly 
sensitive to changes in the level of import tariffs. 
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Table 14. Linear Regression of ln(Wages)
1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
experience 0.025 *** 0.026 *** 0.026 *** 0.028 *** 0.028 *** 0.028 *** 0.027 *** 0.027 *** 0.025 *** 0.024 *** 0.021 *** 0.021 *** 0.020 *** 0.018 ***
[0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001]
experience2 -0.00030 *** -0.00031 *** -0.00030 *** -0.00033 *** -0.00033 *** -0.00032 *** -0.00030 *** -0.00029 *** -0.00026 *** -0.00026 *** -0.00023 *** -0.00023 *** -0.00023 *** -0.00020 ***
[0.00002] [0.00002] [0.00002] [0.00003] [0.00002] [0.00002] [0.00002] [0.00002] [0.00002] [0.00002] [0.00001] [0.00002] [0.00002] [0.00001]
schooling 0.072 *** 0.076 *** 0.079 *** 0.083 *** 0.085 *** 0.088 *** 0.088 *** 0.090 *** 0.089 *** 0.085 *** 0.081 *** 0.083 *** 0.080 *** 0.076 ***
[0.003] [0.003] [0.003] [0.003] [0.003] [0.004] [0.004] [0.004] [0.004] [0.004] [0.004] [0.004] [0.005] [0.004]
married 0.088 *** 0.108 *** 0.102 *** 0.106 *** 0.106 *** 0.099 *** 0.102 *** 0.093 *** 0.104 *** 0.114 *** 0.098 *** 0.103 *** 0.097 *** 0.098 ***
[0.007] [0.008] [0.010] [0.008] [0.009] [0.008] [0.007] [0.007] [0.010] [0.010] [0.010] [0.010] [0.008] [0.009]
cohabitating 0.018 0.018 0.012 0.015 0.028 * 0.016 0.023 0.021 * 0.010 0.035 *** 0.031 *** 0.033 ** 0.027 *** 0.027 **
[0.019] [0.013] [0.019] [0.013] [0.016] [0.014] [0.017] [0.012] [0.016] [0.011] [0.011] [0.014] [0.010] [0.011]
male 0.059 *** 0.057 *** 0.034 0.017 0.020 0.013 0.008 0.009 0.002 0.016 0.030 0.047 ** 0.054 ** 0.052 **
[0.020] [0.019] [0.024] [0.028] [0.030] [0.030] [0.026] [0.029] [0.024] [0.023] [0.025] [0.023] [0.023] [0.021]
firsthead 0.108 *** 0.125 *** 0.123 *** 0.111 *** 0.118 *** 0.119 *** 0.111 *** 0.114 *** 0.120 *** 0.119 *** 0.128 *** 0.121 *** 0.125 *** 0.108 ***
[0.011] [0.014] [0.012] [0.008] [0.010] [0.013] [0.011] [0.007] [0.010] [0.010] [0.010] [0.008] [0.009] [0.009]
secondhead 0.049 *** 0.056 *** 0.064 *** 0.064 *** 0.064 *** 0.067 *** 0.077 *** 0.067 *** 0.064 *** 0.064 *** 0.074 *** 0.063 *** 0.059 *** 0.051 ***
[0.010] [0.011] [0.010] [0.009] [0.015] [0.009] [0.009] [0.008] [0.010] [0.007] [0.009] [0.008] [0.008] [0.009]
ln(population) 0.020 ** 0.037 *** 0.170 *** 0.124 *** 0.072 *** 0.126 *** 0.069 *** 0.015 14.914 *** 16.446 0.011 *** 0.020 *** -0.009 -0.004 **
[0.008] [0.007] [0.014] [0.010] [0.014] [0.015] [0.014] [0.011] [3.734] [12.249] [0.002] [0.004] [0.008] [0.002]
relative distance -0.432 *** -0.547 *** -0.503 *** -0.432 *** -0.164 *** -0.342 *** -0.100 *** -0.169 *** 5.871 *** -74.285 -0.116 *** -0.248 *** -0.144 *** -0.203 ***
[0.036] [0.039] [0.034] [0.028] [0.022] [0.030] [0.029] [0.029] [1.567] [55.248] [0.017] [0.048] [0.016] [0.038]
high exposure 0.097 *** 0.0323 0.399 *** 0.312 *** 0.314 *** 0.265 *** 0.226 *** -0.149 *** -26.133 *** 51.983 0.017 0.094 *** 0.611 *** 0.106 ***
[0.025] [0.024] [0.025] [0.019] [0.039] [0.025] [0.032] [0.021] [6.595] [38.841] [0.030] [0.028] [0.097] [0.022]
low exposure 0.084 *** 0.076 *** 0.323 *** 0.473 *** -0.037 0.625 *** 0.291 *** 0.094 ** -25.735 *** 63.108 0.193 *** -0.102 *** 0.671 *** 0.108 ***
[0.024] [0.025] [0.035] [0.030] [0.058] [0.068] [0.068] [0.044] [6.481] [46.925] [0.039] [0.024] [0.099] [0.034]
No. Obs. 52,716 53,743 53,711 97,987 102,574 106,323 108,302 115,633 122,504 130,862 148,642 159,810 164,539 159,643
***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. All regressions include city dummies and industry indicators. Robust standard errors clustered at the industry level are shown in brackets
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In the second stage the industry wage differentials are pooled over time and regressed 
on the Mexican, the U.S. and the IOM tariffs, a set of year and industry fixed effects, 
and a set of interactions between the industry dummies and a time trend, as specified 
in the following equation, which parallels equation (8) in the previous section:  
 ( ) jttrDtjDjYtTjtjt trDDYTip εηδγβ +×+++= × )(     (11) 
 
As before, a Mexican and U.S. tariff of 0% is artificially assigned to the non-tradable 
industries. The year indicators are included to remove the aggregate variation from all 
the other variables in the right-hand side of equation (11). The industry indicators are 
included to control for unobserved industry characteristics that may be  
constant through time. The inclusion of the interactions between the industry 
dummies and the trend accounts for the possibility that different industries may 
follow different paths through time. Therefore, as with informality in equation (8), 
identification of Tβ  comes from within-industry fluctuations of T  around a time 
trend. 
Table 15 reports the estimates of equation (11). All but one of the estimated 
coefficients are negative, indicating a negative correlation between import tariffs and 
industry wage differentials. Column (a) presents the estimates obtained for the current 
values of the import tariffs. There is a negative and significant effect on wages 
coming from the elimination of the IOM tariff, and this effect is robust to the 
inclusion of the Mexican and the U.S. import tariff in the estimated equation (panel 
4). Column (b) explores the possibility that adjustments in wages with respect to 
changes in the level of import tariffs may require some time to take place. Using the 
1-year lagged values, the column reports smaller effects for the Mexican and the U.S. 
import tariffs, but again only the one from the IOM tariff is statistically significant at 
a 5% level. Column (c) summarizes the dynamic effects by using the sum of the 
current and the 1-year lagged tariffs as regressors. Panels 3 and 4 confirm the 
relevance of the changes in the IOM import tariffs for changes in wage differentials. 
The conclusion from the estimates in table 15 is that the elimination of the IOM 
import tariff has contributed to the increase in wages. Industries with larger cuts in 
tariffs experienced larger increases in wages, and this result is valid both for the 
tradable and the non-tradable sectors. It is important to stress what the significant  
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Table 15. Effect of Trade Liberalization on Wages
(a) (b) (c)
Mex Tariff 0.290 -0.205 -0.145
[0.180] [0.168] [0.096]
No. Obs. 4720 4388 4388
US Tariff -0.216 -0.044 -0.085
[0.315] [0.356] [0.208]
No. Obs. 4680 4361 4345
IOM Tariff -0.121 ** -0.129 ** -0.074 ***
[0.052] [0.052] [0.029]
No. Obs. 4720 4388 4388
Mex Tariff -0.128 -0.038 -0.048
[0.188] [0.183] [0.104]
US Tariff -0.246 -0.074 -0.108
[0.316] [0.359] [0.209]
IOM Tariff -0.116 ** -0.134 ** -0.076 **
[0.055] [0.056] [0.031]
No. Obs. 4680 4361 4345
(a) Current tariffs
(b) 1-year lagged tariffs
(c) Sum of current and 1-year lagged tariffs
***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. All
regressions include year dummies, industry dummies and industry trends. Newey-West
standard errors with 1 lag are shown in brackets.
1
2
3
4
 
 
effect on the IOM tariff could mean here: typically, domestic industries lobby for  
higher tariffs to protect their output and hence the wages paid to their workers. The 
estimates in table 15 seem to suggest instead that industries with higher levels of 
protection are hurt because their inputs become more expensive. 
The next step is to estimate the effect of trade liberalization on the formal-informal 
wage gap. As pointed out by Robbins, D. (1996), empirical work relating trade 
liberalization and income distribution has identified the important anomaly that the 
former has helped in shifting income towards high-skilled labour by increasing its  
relative demand in many developing countries18. Considering that the average years 
of schooling in the formal sector is typically higher than in the informal sector (see 
table 3), the effects of this skill-biased technological change should also be present  
 
                                                 
18 Anomaly in the sense that this result is not what would be predicted by the standard Hecksher-Ohlin 
model of the International Economics theory, considering that low-skilled labour is the abundant factor 
of production in LDCs. 
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Figure 8. Average Real Hourly Wages
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when comparing these two. To see this, figure 8 plots the average real hourly wages 
(in 2002 pesos) for the formal and the informal sectors in Mexico using the April-
June ENEU interviews with 1994 as the base year. The chart clearly shows that after 
enacting NAFTA in 1994 average wages in the informal sector have remained lower 
than their counterpart in the formal sector. From 1989 to 1994 inclusive, real hourly 
wages in the informal sector represented on average 99.02% of the real hourly wages 
in the formal sector. From 1995 to 2002 this figure dropped to 81.03%. Table 16 
presents the changes of the formal-informal wage gap and the import tariffs at the 
sector level over the period 1989 through 200219. The wage gap index increased in 12 
out of 18 sectors during those years. The largest increase is of 2.23 points for the 
Primary metals sector, while the largest decrease is of 3.39 points for the Personal, 
professional and social services sector. Although not reported in the table, while the 
average change in the wage gap for the tradable sectors is positive and equal to 0.66 
points, it is negative and equal to -0.74 points for the non-tradable ones. This could be 
indicative of a negative relationship between the level of the tariffs and the wage 
differentials, which seems to be confirmed by figures 9 and 10: within the tradable  
 
                                                 
19 The changes in the wage gap are calculated as follows: For each year and economic sector the wage 
gap in real hourly wages is obtained by taking the difference between real wages in the formal and the 
informal sectors. The resulting series is expressed setting the estimated gap for 1994 as the base 
observation (1994=1). The change in the wage gap is then obtained as the difference between the 
1989-1991 and the 2000-2002 average values of this index. 
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Table 16:  Change in Import Tariffs and Formal-Informal Wage Differential by Sector
1989-91 to 2000-02a
Sector Wage Differentialb Mex US
Tradables:
Farms, forestry & fishing 0.32 -12.6 -1.3
Mining -0.59 -8.1 -0.2
Food, beverage & tobacco 1.75 -12.6 -3.3
Textiles, apparel & leather 0.89 -15.5 -9.2
Wood products 0.11 -9.3 -3.4
Paper & printing 0.28 -10.6 -0.7
Chemical products 1.00 -11.4 -1.5
Nonmetallic mineral products -0.23 -12.7 -1.5
Primary metals 2.23 -11.5 -1.4
Machinery & equipment 0.04 -12.0 -0.8
Other manufacturing 1.45 -13.7 -0.6
Non-tradables:
Petroleoum & coal extraction -0.48
Construction -3.35
Electricity, gas & water 0.18
Hotels, restaurants & trade 0.95
Transport & storage 1.00
Financial services & real estate -0.08
Personal, professional and social services -3.39
Maximum 2.23 -8.1 -0.2
Minimum -3.39 -15.5 -9.2
Average 0.12 -11.8 -2.2
Source: author's calculations based on the ENEU survey (INEGI), Diario Oficial de la Federacion (Mexico), and
the NBER U.S. Tariff Database. a Changes calculated as the difference between the 2000-02 and the 1989-91
averages. b Wage gap calculated as the difference between average real hourly wages between the formal and the
informal sectors (2002 pesos, 1994=1).  
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Figure 9. Changes in Wage Differentials and the Mexican Import Tariffs  1989-91 to 2000-02 
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Figure 10. Changes in Wage Differentials and the U.S. Import Tariffs 1989-91 to 2000-02 
Tradable Sectors
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sectors larger reductions in both the Mexican and the U.S. import tariffs are 
associated with larger increases in the formal-informal wage gap.  
In order to estimate the effect of trade liberalization on the formal-informal wage gap 
formally, equation (10) is modified in the following way: 
 
ijtjtfIijtijtjtijttfHijtijtHtijtijt fIipIfHHwage εφδβ +×++×+= ×× )()( )(*)(lg   (12) 
 
where )( ijtijt fH ×  is a matrix of interactions between the vector ijtH  and an indicator 
for formality ijtf  that takes the value of 1 if worker i in industry j at time t works in 
the formal sector and 0 otherwise; )( ijtijt fI ×  is a matrix of interactions between the 
industry dummies and the formality indicator; and the rest of the terms are as defined 
before. The new coefficients tfH )( ×δ  capture the part of the variation in wages that is 
attributable to differences in individual and geographic characteristics between the 
formal and the informal workers. The coefficients tfI )( ×φ  are denoted within-industry 
formal-informal wage differentials and they capture the difference in wages between 
formal and informal workers that is attributable to industry affiliation. Equation (12) 
is estimated separately for each year in the sample. As before, in the second stage 
these formal-informal wage differentials are pooled over time and regressed on the 
Mexican import tariff, the U.S. import tariff, the IOM tariff, a set of industry and time 
indicators, and a set of interactions between the industry dummies and a time trend.  
The results for the first stage are reported in table 17. The interactions with the 
formality indicator suggest that there are not important differences in returns to 
potential experience between the formal and the informal workers, but the effects of 
more years of schooling, being the head of a household, living in a bigger city, living 
closer to the U.S.-Mexico border, or living in a state with low exposure to 
globalization are in general significantly larger for the formal workers. As with the 
previous estimations, the regressions in table 17 also included a set of city dummies, 
and the interactions of these with the formality indicator. In most of the cases these 
variables where both individually and jointly significant, indicating that geographic 
location is an important determinant of earnings, and that its effect varies across 
formal and informal workers. The estimated formal-informal wage differentials are 
correlated through time, with year- to-year correlation coefficients ranging from 0.12  
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Table 17. Linear Regression of ln(Wages)
1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
experience 0.026 *** 0.024 *** 0.027 *** 0.028 *** 0.027 *** 0.027 *** 0.025 *** 0.025 *** 0.023 *** 0.023 *** 0.019 *** 0.020 *** 0.019 *** 0.017 ***
[0.001] [0.002] [0.002] [0.001] [0.002] [0.001] [0.002] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001]
experience*formal -0.004 ** 0.002 -0.002 -0.002 0.001 -0.0002 0.004 * 0.003 * 0.004 ** 0.0005 0.001 0.001 0.0002 0.001
[0.002] [0.003] [0.002] [0.001] [0.001] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001]
experience2 -0.00033 *** -0.00032 *** -0.00034 *** -0.00035 *** -0.00034 *** -0.00034 *** -0.00030 *** -0.00029 *** -0.00026 *** -0.00028 *** -0.00024 *** -0.00025 *** -0.00026 *** -0.00022 ***
[0.00002] [0.00003] [0.00002] [0.00003] [0.00003] [0.00002] [0.00002] [0.00002] [0.00002] [0.00002] [0.00002] [0.00002] [0.00002] [0.00002]
experience2*formal 0.00008 *** 0.00001 0.00007 ** 0.00005 ** 0.00004 * 0.00006 *** -0.000001 0.00001 0.00001 0.00005 ** 0.00005 ** 0.00005 ** 0.00008 *** 0.00006 ***
[0.00002] [0.00003] [0.00003] [0.00002] [0.00002] [0.00002] [0.00003] [0.00003] [0.00002] [0.00003] [0.00002] [0.00002] [0.00002] [0.00002]
schooling 0.063 *** 0.063 *** 0.062 *** 0.069 *** 0.067 *** 0.070 *** 0.066 *** 0.070 *** 0.070 *** 0.065 *** 0.060 *** 0.061 *** 0.057 *** 0.054 ***
[0.004] [0.004] [0.004] [0.004] [0.004] [0.004] [0.004] [0.004] [0.005] [0.005] [0.004] [0.005] [0.004] [0.004]
schooling *formal 0.012 *** 0.021 *** 0.026 *** 0.022 *** 0.029 *** 0.030 *** 0.036 *** 0.033 *** 0.034 *** 0.032 *** 0.033 *** 0.036 *** 0.037 *** 0.036 ***
[0.004] [0.004] [0.004] [0.004] [0.004] [0.004] [0.004] [0.005] [0.005] [0.005] [0.004] [0.004] [0.004] [0.004]
married 0.115 *** 0.151 *** 0.125 *** 0.144 *** 0.134 *** 0.115 *** 0.135 *** 0.120 *** 0.140 *** 0.143 *** 0.128 *** 0.144 *** 0.124 *** 0.136 ***
[0.012] [0.013] [0.018] [0.010] [0.011] [0.009] [0.009] [0.010] [0.010] [0.011] [0.012] [0.008] [0.010] [0.008]
married*formal -0.048 *** -0.072 *** -0.041 * -0.071 *** -0.046 *** -0.026 ** -0.061 *** -0.051 *** -0.069 *** -0.056 *** -0.053 *** -0.074 *** -0.048 *** -0.069 ***
[0.014] [0.015] [0.023] [0.013] [0.014] [0.012] [0.010] [0.011] [0.010] [0.012] [0.013] [0.009] [0.011] [0.010]
cohabitating 0.051 ** 0.067 *** 0.047 * 0.057 *** 0.061 *** 0.035 *** 0.064 *** 0.052 *** 0.044 ** 0.066 *** 0.065 *** 0.071 *** 0.049 *** 0.058 ***
[0.023] [0.016] [0.026] [0.014] [0.018] [0.013] [0.021] [0.013] [0.018] [0.010] [0.010] [0.015] [0.011] [0.012]
cohabitating*formal -0.079 *** -0.105 *** -0.083 *** -0.099 *** -0.078 *** -0.044 * -0.100 *** -0.079 *** -0.078 *** -0.068 *** -0.077 *** -0.079 *** -0.047 *** -0.063 ***
[0.026] [0.025] [0.026] [0.021] [0.023] [0.024] [0.024] [0.017] [0.021] [0.013] [0.014] [0.017] [0.012] [0.013]
male 0.111 *** 0.102 *** 0.085 *** 0.057 * 0.059 0.061 ** 0.052 0.063 ** 0.033 0.054 ** 0.085 *** 0.095 *** 0.095 *** 0.095 ***
[0.021] [0.021] [0.030] [0.029] [0.037] [0.031] [0.032] [0.029] [0.021] [0.021] [0.018] [0.017] [0.020] [0.019]
male*formal -0.078 *** -0.070 *** -0.077 *** -0.057 * -0.057 * -0.075 *** -0.066 ** -0.087 *** -0.045 * -0.053 ** -0.084 *** -0.073 *** -0.062 *** -0.065 ***
[0.024] [0.022] [0.028] [0.029] [0.033] [0.029] [0.031] [0.027] [0.023] [0.023] [0.018] [0.022] [0.022] [0.020]
firsthead 0.132 *** 0.163 *** 0.128 *** 0.123 *** 0.152 *** 0.149 *** 0.135 *** 0.130 *** 0.140 *** 0.146 *** 0.150 *** 0.143 *** 0.151 *** 0.136 ***
[0.015] [0.024] [0.023] [0.010] [0.015] [0.015] [0.015] [0.011] [0.016] [0.013] [0.014] [0.010] [0.014] [0.013]
firsthead*formal -0.040 *** -0.062 ** -0.008 -0.021 * -0.063 *** -0.058 *** -0.049 *** -0.033 *** -0.044 *** -0.050 *** -0.045 *** -0.044 *** -0.051 *** -0.052 ***
[0.015] [0.024] [0.027] [0.012] [0.019] [0.016] [0.019] [0.012] [0.016] [0.013] [0.017] [0.012] [0.014] [0.015]
secondhead 0.052 *** 0.089 *** 0.073 *** 0.055 *** 0.071 ** 0.071 *** 0.082 *** 0.072 *** 0.054 *** 0.068 *** 0.075 *** 0.064 *** 0.061 *** 0.054 ***
[0.016] [0.021] [0.019] [0.014] [0.028] [0.014] [0.014] [0.009] [0.014] [0.009] [0.009] [0.012] 0.010 0.013
secondhead*formal -0.012 -0.055 ** -0.017 0.010 -0.017 -0.010 -0.006 -0.007 0.023 -0.001 0.003 0.0005 0.001 0.0004
[0.018] [0.022] [0.023] [0.020] [0.028] [0.018] [0.018] [0.013] [0.016] [0.012] [0.012] [0.016] [0.013] [0.014]
ln(population) 0.006 0.033 *** 0.163 *** 0.114 *** 0.087 *** 0.133 *** 0.126 *** 0.005 9.644 0.076 *** 0.014 *** 0.031 *** 0.043 *** 0.039 ***
[0.011] [0.008] [0.016] [0.014] [0.020] [0.020] [0.011] [0.016] [6.184] [0.014] [0.002] [0.004] [0.004] [0.003]
ln(population)*formal 0.040 *** 0.043 *** 0.065 *** 0.034 *** 0.041 *** 0.033 *** 0.034 *** 0.021 *** 10.883 0.025 *** -0.011 *** -0.013 *** -0.018 *** -0.020 ***
[0.005] [0.004] [0.004] [0.005] [0.004] [0.004] [0.005] [0.004] [8.399] [0.005] [0.003] [0.005] [0.005] [0.005]
relative distance -0.512 *** -0.606 *** -0.537 *** -0.383 *** -0.210 *** -0.357 *** -0.237 *** -0.199 *** -43.703 -0.526 *** -0.198 *** -0.419 *** -0.387 *** -0.350 ***
[0.035] [0.059] [0.032] [0.042] [0.030] [0.050] [0.029] [0.045] [27.920] [0.032] [0.025] [0.067] [0.031] [0.048]
relative distance*formal 0.062 0.035 0.064 -0.103 * -0.042 0.035 0.261 *** 0.260 *** -180.655 0.265 *** 0.284 *** 0.243 *** 0.250 *** 0.236 ***
[0.045] [0.042] [0.045] [0.053] [0.063] [0.059] [0.041] [0.037] [139.976] [0.048] [0.035] [0.074] [0.039] [0.055]
high exposure 0.064 * 0.0299 0.378 *** 0.336 *** 0.341 *** 0.297 *** 0.367 *** -0.185 *** -16.786 0.081 *** 0.002 0.107 *** 0.185 *** 0.167 ***
[0.036] [0.051] [0.043] [0.033] [0.060] [0.046] [0.040] [0.025] [10.913] [0.027] [0.019] [0.018] [0.017] [0.018]
high exposure*formal 0.109 ** 0.1234 *** 0.204 *** -0.010 0.039 0.084 0.185 *** 0.137 *** -150.909 0.061 -0.046 * -0.052 ** -0.112 *** -0.091 ***
[0.047] [0.045] [0.043] [0.050] [0.055] [0.057] [0.044] [0.040] [116.869] [0.038] [0.025] [0.026] [0.031] [0.025]
low exposure 0.097 ** 0.073 0.292 *** 0.467 *** -0.076 0.647 *** 0.611 *** 0.074 30.724 0.351 *** 0.221 *** -0.101 *** 0.243 *** 0.155 ***
[0.043] [0.047] [0.048] [0.053] [0.083] [0.093] [0.056] [0.075] [19.787] [0.055] [0.033] [0.029] [0.027] [0.028]
low exposure*formal 0.028 0.263 *** 0.150 *** 0.114 ** 0.376 *** 0.163 ** 0.276 *** 0.055 34.766 0.184 *** -0.109 ** 0.067 -0.278 *** -0.021
[0.052] [0.044] [0.046] [0.053] [0.080] [0.080] [0.053] [0.055] [26.860] [0.044] [0.050] [0.051] [0.065] [0.052]
No. Obs. 52,716 53,743 53,711 97,987 102,574 106,323 108,302 115,633 122,504 130,862 148,642 159,810 164,539 159,643
***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. All regressions include city dummies, industry dummies, and interactions of these with an indicator for formality. Robust standard errors clustered at the industry level are shown in brackets
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Table 18. Effect of Trade Liberalization on Wage Differentials
(a) (b) (c)
Mex Tariff -0.169 -0.356 -0.074
[0.319] [0.352] [0.191]
No. Obs. 3938 3710 3710
US Tariff -0.695 -1.450 ** -0.949 **
[0.760] [0.585] [0.371]
No. Obs. 3938 3964 3680
IOM Tariff 0.115 0.003 0.052
[0.108] [0.120] [0.065]
No. Obs. 3968 3710 3710
Mex Tariff -0.289 -0.334 -0.097
[0.352] [0.379] [0.209]
US Tariff -0.633 -1.399 ** -0.904 **
[0.751] [0.581] [0.370]
IOM Tariff 0.138 0.022 0.051
[0.117] [0.129] [0.070]
No. Obs. 3938 3694 3680
(a) Current tariffs
(b) 1-year lagged tariffs
(c) Sum of current and 1-year lagged tariffs
***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. All regressions 
include year dummies, industry dummies and industry trends. Newey-West standard errors
with 1 lag are shown in brackets.
1
2
3
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to 0.70 and averaging 0.36. This suggests that the formal-informal wage gap could 
also be highly sensitive to changes in the level of import tariffs. 
In the second stage the within industry formal-informal wage differentials are pooled 
over time and used as the dependent variable in the estimation of the following 
equation, which parallels equations (8) and (11) above:  
 ( ) jttrDtjDjYtTjtjtfI trDDYT εηδγβφ +×+++= ×× )()(     (13) 
 
Table 18 reports the estimates of equation (13). Column (a) presents the estimates 
obtained for the current values of the import tariffs. None of the estimates in this 
column is significantly different from zero. The coefficients for the Mexican and the 
U.S. import tariffs are negative, indicating a negative correlation with the formal-
informal wage differentials. Column (b) explores the possibility that adjustments in 
the wage differentials with respect to changes in the level of import tariffs may 
require some time to take place. Using the 1-year lagged values, the column reports 
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larger effects for the Mexican and the U.S. import tariffs, but only the second one is 
statistically significant at a 5% level. Column (c) summarizes the dynamic effects by 
using the sum of the current and the 1-year lagged tariffs as regressors. Panels 2 and 4 
confirm the relevance of the changes in the U.S. import tariffs for changes in the 
wage gap. The conclusion from the estimates in table 18 is that the elimination of the 
U.S. import tariff contributes to the increase of the formal-informal wage differential, 
but this effect takes some time to show up. This result may also suggest that wages in 
Mexico are somewhat sticky, as they do not adjust to changes in the economic 
environment immediately after these take place. Given the insignificance and the 
large standard errors of the estimates of the IOM tariff, it can also be said that this 
result is valid for the tradable sectors only. The evidence in this subsection supports 
the predictions from the dynamic industry model with firm heterogeneity in section 2, 
and is also in line with the results from previous studies regarding the effect of trade 
liberalization on the distribution of wages. 
 
 
8. Conclusions 
 
This paper has investigated the relationship between trade liberalization and 
informality in Mexico during the 1990s. Using the Melitz, M. J. (2003) model of 
heterogeneous firms to analyse the possible implications of trade liberalization on the 
rate of informality, it is predicted that by making more profitable to some firms to 
enter the formal sector, by forcing the less productive informal firms to exit the 
industry, and by inducing the most productive formal firms to engage in trade, trade 
liberalization could reduce the incidence of informality, particularly in industries 
characterized by higher levels of aggregate productivity. Both the exit of the least 
productive firms and the additional export sales gained by the more productive firms 
reallocate market shares towards the more productive firms and contribute to an 
aggregate productivity gain. The increased labour demand by the more productive 
firms and the new entrants tends to increase more the real wages in industries that 
experience larger tariff cuts. The empirical analysis provides supporting evidence for 
this view. Reductions in the Mexican import tariffs are found to be significant in 
reducing the likelihood of informality in the tradable sectors. This result contrasts 
with the findings of Goldberg, P. K. & N. Pavcnik (2003) for Brazil and Colombia, 
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but one has to keep in mind that liberalization of trade in those countries has been 
rather different from the 1990s Mexican experience. The analysis in this paper also 
indicates that for a given reduction in the Mexican import tariff, informality decreases 
less in industries with higher levels of import penetration; and that for a given 
reduction in the U.S. import tariff, informality decreases more in industries that are 
relatively more export oriented. It is also found that trade liberalization affects the 
employment shares and the composition of informality across industries, but it does 
not seem to have an impact on the size of the labour force of firms, as reported by 
workers when asked about the number of people in their workplaces.  
Finally, the paper also presented evidence of an increase in industry wage 
differentials and a widening effect of trade liberalization on the formal-informal wage 
gap. Previous empirical works relating trade liberalization and the income distribution 
find that the former has disproportionately benefited high-skilled labour by increasing 
its relative demand in many developing countries. Considering that the level of skills 
in the formal sector is typically higher than in the informal sector, a skill-biased 
technological change seems to be also present when comparing these two.  
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Appendix A: Proof that P0 does not change with trade liberalization 
 
In a model like the one described in section 2, an equilibrium will be characterized by 
a mass of firms XFI MMMM ++=  and an ex post distribution of productivities 
( )ϕµ  over a subset of ( )∞,0 . ( )ϕµ  is conditional on successful entry to the industry 
and is truncated at *ϕ : 
 
( ) ( )( )⎪⎩
⎪⎨
⎧ ≥−=
otherwise       0
  if       
1
*
* ϕϕϕ
ϕ
ϕµ G
g
      (A.1) 
 
The average productivities in different sectors of the industry are determined by the 
ex post productivity distribution and the zero-profit productivity cut-offs. Let ϕ~  be 
the weighted average productivity across all firms. Then: 
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The average productivity across all firms, ϕ~ , is based only on market share 
differences between firms. If some firms are formal or trading, then this average will 
not reflect the additional shares of more productive firms. Furthermore, neither of 
these averages reflect the proportions α , β , and τ  of output units that are “gained” 
and “lost” in passing to the formal sector and to the trading sub-sector, respectively. 
Let tϕ~  be the weighted productivity average that reflects these differences. tϕ~  can be 
written as: 
 
( )( )[ ] ( )( )[ ][ ] 11111111 ~11~11~1~ −−−−−−− ⎭⎬⎫⎩⎨⎧ ++++++= σσσσ ϕτβαϕβαϕϕ XXFFIt MMMM  
 (A.3) 
 
tϕ~  can then be used to obtain expressions for the aggregate prices and expenditure 
levels, P and R respectively. In particular: 
 
( )
( )
( )
t
t
t
t q
q
r
PQP ϕρ
ϕ
ϕ
ϕ ρ
ρ
σ
~
~
~
~ 11
0
−
===       (A.4) 
 
This implies that the derivative of 0P  with respect to tϕ~  is equal to: 
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and its sign depends on the sign of the numerator. For example, for it to be positive: 
 ( ) ( ) ( ) 0~~'1~ >−− ttt qq ϕϕρϕ        (A.6) 
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or, 
 ( )
( ) ( ) σρϕ
ϕϕ =−> 1
1
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~'~
t
tt
q
q
       (A.7) 
 
but the left-hand side of this inequality is also equal to σ , as it is simply the elasticity 
of ( )tq ϕ~  with respect to tϕ~ . Hence, the numerator in (A.5) is equal to zero, implying 
that 0P  is not affected by changes in tϕ~ .  
 
 
Appendix B: Proof of Proposition 1 
 
The formal proofs for points 1 and 3 of proposition 1 are the same as in the original 
model in Melitz, M.J. (2003), and therefore there are not repeated here. The way in 
which trade liberalization works is the following: a decrease in τ  to ττ <'  will 
induce an increase in the industry’s cut-off productivity level *ϕ  to ** ' ϕϕ > , and a 
decrease in the cut-off productivity level for the trading sub-sector *Xϕ  to ** ' XX ϕϕ < . 
There are two potential channels through which trade can affect the distribution of 
surviving firms. The first one is through the increase in product market competition, 
which in the present model is not operative due to the assumption of monopolistic 
competition under C.E.S. preferences. The second channel operates through the 
domestic factor market where firms compete for labour. As mentioned in section 2.2, 
expanded exposure to trade offers new profit opportunities only to the more 
productive firms who can cover the entry cost Xf , and it also induces more entry of 
new firms to the industry, as prospective firms respond to the higher potential returns 
associated with a good productivity draw. The increased labour demand by the more 
productive firms and new entrants bids up the real wages and forces the least 
productive firms to exit. From equation (6), it can be seen that *Fϕ  is an increasing 
function of real wages, w , so that this would also translate into an increase in the cut-
off productivity level for formality: 
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because 0<∂
∂
τ
w . The fact that both *ϕ  and *Fϕ  increase with trade liberalization 
means that there will be an ambiguous effect on the size of the labour force in the 
informal sector.  The fact that *Xϕ  and τ decrease with trade liberalization translates 
into an increase in the labour force of the trading-formal sub-sector. To see this 
formally, recall that the prices and output in each one of the sectors are given by the 
following equations: 
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Therefore, using equation (2), the labour demands in each sector can be written as: 
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And total employment in the industry is given by: 
 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )∫∫∫ ∞∞ +++=
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where eL  is the labour used by new entrants for investing in the industry’s fixed entry 
cost ef  (see Melitz, M.J (2003)), and ( )ϕµ  is the ex-post distribution of 
productivities defined in equation (A.1). In equilibrium, the market clearing condition 
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for investment workers requires eL  to be equal to the total investment by new 
entrants, ee fM , where eM  is the total number of new entrants to the industry. Also, 
in equilibrium, stability requires that the mass of successful entrants exactly replaces 
the mass of incumbents who are hit with the bad shock and exit: MMp ein δ= , where 
inp  is the probability of successful entry into the industry (e.g. of drawing a 
productivity parameter *ϕϕ ≥ ) and δ  is the probability of being hit by a bad shock 
in every period. These two equilibrium conditions together with the free entry 
condition to the industry ( )[ ]*1 ϕδπ Gfe −=  (where π  are the average profits in the 
industry) imply that the labour force employed in investment by new entrants can be 
written as: 
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eee ===        (B.5) 
 
From equation (B.5) is easy to see that trade liberalization increases the labour 
demand of the new entrants: a decrease in τ  increases *ϕ , which in turn increases 
π . Therefore, eL  increases as well. On the other hand, it is also easy to see the 
positive impact of trade liberalization on the employment share of the trading-formal 
sub-sector. Using the last equation in (B.3) together with equation (A.1) in the last 
term of the right-hand side of equation (B.4): 
 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( ) ϕϕϕατ βρϕϕϕµϕ ϕ σ
σ
ϕ
dg
w
PQf
G
d
XX
XX ∫∫
∞
−
∞
⎥⎥⎦
⎤
⎢⎢⎣
⎡
⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
+
++−= **
1
* 1
1
1
1l   (B.6) 
 
which is clearly negatively related to τ : when τ  decreases, the term in brackets 
increases, *ϕ  increases so that ( )[ ]*11 ϕG−  increases, and *Xϕ  decreases so that the 
area of integration increases as well. Thus, the employment share of the trading-
formal sub-sector increases with trade liberalization. Finally, consider the 
employment share of the formal sector in the domestic market. Using again equation 
(A.1) together with the second equation in (B.3) in the second integral on the right-
hand side of equation (B.4): 
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where ( )*~ FF ϕϕ  is the average productivity in the formal sector, as defined in equation 
(A.2). From this last expression it can already be seen that the relationship between τ  
and the employment share of the formal sector (and hence of the informal sector) is 
ambiguous. The derivative of ( )*~ FF ϕϕ  with respect to τ  is negative, as *Fϕ  increases 
with a decrease in τ  and Fϕ~  is increasing in *Fϕ . However, the sign of the derivative 
of ( )[ ] ( )[ ]** 11 ϕϕ GG F −−  cannot be determined, as it depends on the shape of the 
distribution ( )ϕg  and the specific values of the parameters in the model: 
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Looking at the numerator of (B.8), ( ) ( )** 11 FGG ϕϕ −>−  given that ** Fϕϕ < . Using 
equations (5) and (6), τ
ϕ
τ
ϕ
∂
∂<∂
∂ **F  whenever ( ) ρρα
β −⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡
+
+< 1
1
1
1
I
F
f
f , and 
( ) ( )** ϕϕ gg F >  when the distribution ( )ϕg  is sufficiently skewed to the left. In such a 
case, the share of employment in the formal sector increases with trade liberalization. 
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Appendix C: Proof of Proposition 2 
 
The only difference with respect to the proof in proposition 1 in appendix B is that 
now it is not possible to determine a unique sign of the derivative of *Fϕ  with respect 
to τ . Recall that: 
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where ( )γεα
β ρρ −−⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛
+
+= − 1
1
1 1B . Considering that now β  is also affected by trade 
liberalization, so that 0<∂
∂
τ
β : 
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the sign of τ
ϕ
∂
∂ *F  is undetermined, as 0<∂
∂
τ
w  and 0<∂
∂
τ
β . Thus, in general it is not 
possible to say whether *Fϕ  increases or decreases, inducing less or more firms to 
enter the formal sector after trade liberalization. However, using the results for market 
share reallocations, it is possible to find cases in which the sign of τ
ϕ
∂
∂ *F  is uniquely 
determined. To begin, , recall that revenues from sales to the foreign market increase 
after trade liberalization, so that 
( )
0<∂
∂
τ
ϕXr . Using the last pair of equations in (B.2): 
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For this inequality to hold, the numerator of the last term in the right-hand side has to 
negative: 
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On the other hand, total revenues in the trading-formal sub-sector, ( ) ( )ϕτ σ Fr−+ 11 , 
also increase after trade liberalization, as there is a market share reallocation towards 
these firms. Thus, using the second pair of equations in (B.2): 
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As before, for this inequality to hold, the last term in the right-hand side has to be 
negative, or: 
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Since 1>τ , then 1
1
1
1 <+−στ . Therefore, equations (C.4) and (C.6) together imply 
that: 
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Now, rewrite revenues ( )ϕXr  as a function of  *Fϕ , using expressions in (B.2): 
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The derivative of (C.8) with respect to τ  is equal to: 
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and it is negative because of (C.3). Thus, it has to be the case that: 
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Now, (C.7) can be used to determine the possible signs of τϕη ,*F . Consider first the 
case when 0,,1 =−+ ττβ ηη w . Then it must be that 0,* >τϕη F  for (C.10) to hold. 
Therefore, when the elasticity of productivity in the formal sector with respect to τ  is 
equal to the elasticity of wages, 0
*
>∂
∂
τ
ϕF  and more firms are induced to leave the 
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informal sector. In this case, using (B.8) it can be seen that the share of employment 
in the formal sector will increase. 
Consider now the case when 0,,1 <−+ ττβ ηη w . This implies that 0,* >τϕη F  and 
sufficiently large for (C.10) to hold. Thus, when the elasticity of productivity in the 
formal sector with respect to τ  is larger than the elasticity of wages (in absolute 
terms), 0
*
>∂
∂
τ
ϕF  and more firms are induced to leave the informal sector. In this 
case, (B.8) implies that the share of employment in the formal sector will also 
increase. 
Finally, consider the case in which 
1
10 1,,1 +<−< −+ σττβ τηη w . For (C.10) to hold, it 
is required that: (a) 0
,*
≥τϕη F  or (b) 1
10 1,1,,* +−>−>> −+ στβττϕ τηηη wF . If  (a) holds, 
then 0
*
≥∂
∂
τ
ϕF  and the share of employment in the formal sector increases or stays the 
same after trade liberalization. On the other hand, if (b) holds, then the share of 
employment in the formal sector will decrease with reductions in τ . 
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